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Article: On Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe: A Reply to Stephen Puryear

TitleOn Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe: A Reply to Stephen Puryear
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00048402.asp
Citation
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2015 How to Cite?
AbstractStephen Puryear argues that William Lane Craig's view, that time as duration is logically prior to the potentially infinite divisions that we make of it, involves the idea that time is prior to any parts we conceive within it (Priority of the Whole with respect to Time: PWT). He objects that PWT entails the Priority of the Whole with respect to Events (PWE), and that it subverts the argument, used by proponents of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) such as Craig, against an eternal past based on the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite sequence of events. I argue that proponents of KCA can affirm that time is not discrete, nor is it continuous with actual infinite number of parts or points, but rather that it is a continuum with various parts yet without an actual infinite number of parts or points. I defend this view, and I reply to Puryear's other objections. © 2015 Australasian Association of Philosophy
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/220687
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.747

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLoke, TEA-
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-16T06:49:39Z-
dc.date.available2015-10-16T06:49:39Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 2015-
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/220687-
dc.description.abstractStephen Puryear argues that William Lane Craig's view, that time as duration is logically prior to the potentially infinite divisions that we make of it, involves the idea that time is prior to any parts we conceive within it (Priority of the Whole with respect to Time: PWT). He objects that PWT entails the Priority of the Whole with respect to Events (PWE), and that it subverts the argument, used by proponents of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) such as Craig, against an eternal past based on the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite sequence of events. I argue that proponents of KCA can affirm that time is not discrete, nor is it continuous with actual infinite number of parts or points, but rather that it is a continuum with various parts yet without an actual infinite number of parts or points. I defend this view, and I reply to Puryear's other objections. © 2015 Australasian Association of Philosophy-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00048402.asp-
dc.relation.ispartofAustralasian Journal of Philosophy-
dc.rightsPreprint: This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in [JOURNAL TITLE] on [date of publication], available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/[Article DOI]. Postprint: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in [JOURNAL TITLE] on [date of publication], available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/[Article DOI].-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleOn Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe: A Reply to Stephen Puryear-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailLoke, TEA: andyloke@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityLoke, TEA=rp01982-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00048402.2015.1089448-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84945205371-
dc.identifier.hkuros256131-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage5-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-

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