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Article: Central-local conflict and property cycle: A Chinese style

TitleCentral-local conflict and property cycle: A Chinese style
Authors
KeywordsGovernment conflict
Property cycle
China
Issue Date2011
Citation
Habitat International, 2011, v. 35, n. 1, p. 126-132 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper reviews how central-local government conflicts pertaining to financial systems, fiscal distribution and land usage have affected the property cycle in China over the past two decades. The literature divides the property cycle in terms of residential construction into 3 stages: Pilot Experimental, Double Track, and Complete Commercialization. At each stage, there are persistent and repetitive conflicts over financial, fiscal and land resources between central and local governments. When the central government takes control, the property market turns to adjustment; when local governments gain advantage, a property boom emerges. As commodity market reform steps forward, the central government's influence on property adjustment is gradually lessened; while local governments' impact on property boom is increasingly intensified. Analysis of literature also indicates that China's property cycle is not well explained by economic fundamentals alone, for government conflicts have invalidated or lessened their impacts on the property sector. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/219633
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.029
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.038

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, Jing-
dc.contributor.authorChiang, Yat Hung-
dc.contributor.authorChoy, Lennon-
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-23T02:57:34Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-23T02:57:34Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationHabitat International, 2011, v. 35, n. 1, p. 126-132-
dc.identifier.issn0197-3975-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/219633-
dc.description.abstractThis paper reviews how central-local government conflicts pertaining to financial systems, fiscal distribution and land usage have affected the property cycle in China over the past two decades. The literature divides the property cycle in terms of residential construction into 3 stages: Pilot Experimental, Double Track, and Complete Commercialization. At each stage, there are persistent and repetitive conflicts over financial, fiscal and land resources between central and local governments. When the central government takes control, the property market turns to adjustment; when local governments gain advantage, a property boom emerges. As commodity market reform steps forward, the central government's influence on property adjustment is gradually lessened; while local governments' impact on property boom is increasingly intensified. Analysis of literature also indicates that China's property cycle is not well explained by economic fundamentals alone, for government conflicts have invalidated or lessened their impacts on the property sector. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofHabitat International-
dc.subjectGovernment conflict-
dc.subjectProperty cycle-
dc.subjectChina-
dc.titleCentral-local conflict and property cycle: A Chinese style-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.06.002-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-77956916368-
dc.identifier.volume35-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage126-
dc.identifier.epage132-

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