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 Publisher Website: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.36
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Book Chapter: Probability in ethics
Title  Probability in ethics 

Authors  
Keywords  Ethics Probability Expected utility theory Utilitarianism Egalitarianism 
Issue Date  2016 
Publisher  Oxford University Press 
Citation  Probability in ethics. In Hájek, A & Hitchcock, C (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016 How to Cite? 
Abstract  It is natural to think that the most basic questions in ethical theory do not have much to do with probability. Given answers to these questions, we can try to extend them to cases involving probability, though this job might best be handled by more technical disciplines. This chapter is an argument for the opposite view. The major ethical problems to do with probability involve very little mathematics; many topics which seem to have nothing to do with probability are arguably all about probability; and thinking about various problems to do with probability can help solve analogous problems which do not involve probability, sometimes even revealing that popular positions about such problems are incoherent. Among the topics discussed are: interpretations of probability; expected utility theory; utilitarianism; egalitarianism; fairness; the priority view; population size; incommensurability; continuity; nonexpected utility theory; evaluative measurement; decision theory; act consequentialism; rule consequentialism; contractualism; and deontology. 
Persistent Identifier  http://hdl.handle.net/10722/218448 
ISBN 
DC Field  Value  Language 

dc.contributor.author  McCarthy, DP   
dc.date.accessioned  20150918T06:37:50Z   
dc.date.available  20150918T06:37:50Z   
dc.date.issued  2016   
dc.identifier.citation  Probability in ethics. In Hájek, A & Hitchcock, C (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016   
dc.identifier.isbn  9780199607617   
dc.identifier.uri  http://hdl.handle.net/10722/218448   
dc.description.abstract  It is natural to think that the most basic questions in ethical theory do not have much to do with probability. Given answers to these questions, we can try to extend them to cases involving probability, though this job might best be handled by more technical disciplines. This chapter is an argument for the opposite view. The major ethical problems to do with probability involve very little mathematics; many topics which seem to have nothing to do with probability are arguably all about probability; and thinking about various problems to do with probability can help solve analogous problems which do not involve probability, sometimes even revealing that popular positions about such problems are incoherent. Among the topics discussed are: interpretations of probability; expected utility theory; utilitarianism; egalitarianism; fairness; the priority view; population size; incommensurability; continuity; nonexpected utility theory; evaluative measurement; decision theory; act consequentialism; rule consequentialism; contractualism; and deontology.   
dc.language  eng   
dc.publisher  Oxford University Press   
dc.relation.ispartof  The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy   
dc.subject  Ethics   
dc.subject  Probability   
dc.subject  Expected utility theory   
dc.subject  Utilitarianism   
dc.subject  Egalitarianism   
dc.title  Probability in ethics   
dc.type  Book_Chapter   
dc.identifier.email  McCarthy, DP: mccarthy@hku.hk   
dc.identifier.authority  McCarthy, DP=rp01447   
dc.identifier.doi  10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.36   
dc.identifier.hkuros  250719   
dc.identifier.hkuros  250718   
dc.publisher.place  Oxford, UK   