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Article: Discontinuities in Signaling Behavior Upon the Decision for War: An Analysis of China's Prewar Signaling Behavior

TitleDiscontinuities in Signaling Behavior Upon the Decision for War: An Analysis of China's Prewar Signaling Behavior
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/
Citation
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2015, v. 15 n. 2, p. 279-317 How to Cite?
AbstractThere is always a time gap between the decision for war and its implementation. I exploit this time gap to study how the signaling of resolve changes after the decision for war is made, based on the wars that China fought since 1949. I study the series of signals that China sent after it had made its decisions for war in Korea (1950), India (1962) and Vietnam (1979), and compare them with the signals sent just before the decisions were made. I find patterns in Chinese prewar signaling that reflect how strategic incentives for the signaling of resolve change before and after the decision for war. The study generates theoretical expectations on discontinuities in signaling behavior upon the decision for war – an unexplored research area with direct policy implications.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/216512
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.5
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.539

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorQuek, CK-
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-18T05:30:01Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-18T05:30:01Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2015, v. 15 n. 2, p. 279-317-
dc.identifier.issn1470-482X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/216512-
dc.description.abstractThere is always a time gap between the decision for war and its implementation. I exploit this time gap to study how the signaling of resolve changes after the decision for war is made, based on the wars that China fought since 1949. I study the series of signals that China sent after it had made its decisions for war in Korea (1950), India (1962) and Vietnam (1979), and compare them with the signals sent just before the decisions were made. I find patterns in Chinese prewar signaling that reflect how strategic incentives for the signaling of resolve change before and after the decision for war. The study generates theoretical expectations on discontinuities in signaling behavior upon the decision for war – an unexplored research area with direct policy implications.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Relations of the Asia-Pacific-
dc.titleDiscontinuities in Signaling Behavior Upon the Decision for War: An Analysis of China's Prewar Signaling Behavior-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailQuek, CK: quek@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityQuek, CK=rp01797-
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/irap/lcu023-
dc.identifier.hkuros250606-
dc.identifier.volume15-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage279-
dc.identifier.epage317-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-

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