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Article: Interlocking patrimonialisms and state formation in qing China and early modern Europe

TitleInterlocking patrimonialisms and state formation in qing China and early modern Europe
Authors
KeywordsBureaucracy
China
Empire
Europe
Patrimonialism
Qing
State
Issue Date2011
Citation
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2011, v. 636, n. 1, p. 164-181 How to Cite?
AbstractFamilial power contributed to binding territories together and systematically severing them in both China and early modern European states. In the early Qing (1644-1911) Empire, Manchu conquerors met the challenges of securing and expanding rule by discovering ways to use laterally related brothers and imperial bondservants to hold Chinese bureaucrats in check, while deploying bureaucracy to restrain princely brothers from partitioning the state. The ensuing interlock of patrimonial practices and bureaucracy, developed in a style similar to ancien regime France, stabilized political power for centuries.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/216344
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.708
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.164

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, Liping-
dc.contributor.authorAdams, Julia-
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-14T12:19:47Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-14T12:19:47Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.citationAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2011, v. 636, n. 1, p. 164-181-
dc.identifier.issn0002-7162-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/216344-
dc.description.abstractFamilial power contributed to binding territories together and systematically severing them in both China and early modern European states. In the early Qing (1644-1911) Empire, Manchu conquerors met the challenges of securing and expanding rule by discovering ways to use laterally related brothers and imperial bondservants to hold Chinese bureaucrats in check, while deploying bureaucracy to restrain princely brothers from partitioning the state. The ensuing interlock of patrimonial practices and bureaucracy, developed in a style similar to ancien regime France, stabilized political power for centuries.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science-
dc.subjectBureaucracy-
dc.subjectChina-
dc.subjectEmpire-
dc.subjectEurope-
dc.subjectPatrimonialism-
dc.subjectQing-
dc.subjectState-
dc.titleInterlocking patrimonialisms and state formation in qing China and early modern Europe-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.natureLink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0002716211402922-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-79960431437-
dc.identifier.volume636-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage164-
dc.identifier.epage181-
dc.identifier.eissn1552-3349-

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