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Conference Paper: SCORAM: oblivious RAM for secure computation

TitleSCORAM: oblivious RAM for secure computation
Authors
KeywordsOblivious RAM
Secure Computation
Issue Date2014
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc.
Citation
The 2014 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'14) Scottsdale, AZ., 3-7 November 2014. In Conference Proceedings, 2014, p. 191-202 How to Cite?
AbstractOblivious RAMs (ORAMs) have traditionally been measured by their bandwidth overhead and client storage. We observe that when using ORAMs to build secure computation protocols for RAM programs, the size of the ORAM circuits is more relevant to the performance. We therefore embark on a study of the circuit-complexity of several recently proposed ORAMconstructions. Our careful implementation and experiments show that asymptotic analysis is not indicative of the true performance of ORAM in secure computation protocols with practical data sizes. We then present scoram, a heuristic compact ORAM design optimized for secure computation protocols. Our new design is almost 10x smaller in circuit size and also faster than all other designs we have tested for realistic settings (i.e., memory sizes between 4MB and 2GB, constrained by 2-80 failure probability). scoram makes it feasible to perform secure computations on gigabyte-sized data sets. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/214752
ISBN
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, XS-
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Y-
dc.contributor.authorChan, HTH-
dc.contributor.authorShelat, A-
dc.contributor.authorShi, E-
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-21T11:54:11Z-
dc.date.available2015-08-21T11:54:11Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationThe 2014 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'14) Scottsdale, AZ., 3-7 November 2014. In Conference Proceedings, 2014, p. 191-202-
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4503-2957-6-
dc.identifier.issn1543-7221-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/214752-
dc.description.abstractOblivious RAMs (ORAMs) have traditionally been measured by their bandwidth overhead and client storage. We observe that when using ORAMs to build secure computation protocols for RAM programs, the size of the ORAM circuits is more relevant to the performance. We therefore embark on a study of the circuit-complexity of several recently proposed ORAMconstructions. Our careful implementation and experiments show that asymptotic analysis is not indicative of the true performance of ORAM in secure computation protocols with practical data sizes. We then present scoram, a heuristic compact ORAM design optimized for secure computation protocols. Our new design is almost 10x smaller in circuit size and also faster than all other designs we have tested for realistic settings (i.e., memory sizes between 4MB and 2GB, constrained by 2-80 failure probability). scoram makes it feasible to perform secure computations on gigabyte-sized data sets. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc.-
dc.relation.ispartofACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security Proceedings-
dc.rightsACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security Proceedings. Copyright © Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.-
dc.subjectOblivious RAM-
dc.subjectSecure Computation-
dc.titleSCORAM: oblivious RAM for secure computation-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailChan, HTH: hubert@cs.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityChan, HTH=rp01312-
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/2660267.2660365-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84910613463-
dc.identifier.hkuros247363-
dc.identifier.spage191-
dc.identifier.epage202-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 150902-

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