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Article: Epistemicism and the Liar

TitleEpistemicism and the Liar
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0039-7857
Citation
Synthese, 2015, v. 192 n. 3, p. 679-699 How to Cite?
AbstractOne well known approach to the soritical paradoxes is epistemicism, the view that propositions involving vague notions have definite truth values, though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. Recently, Paul Horwich has extended this approach to the liar paradox, arguing that the liar proposition has a truth value, though it is impossible to know which one it is. The main virtue of the epistemicist approach is that it need not reject classical logic, and in particular the unrestricted acceptance of the principle of bivalence and law of excluded middle. Regardless of its success in solving the soritical paradoxes, the epistemicist approach faces a number of independent objections when it is applied to the liar paradox. I argue that the approach does not offer a satisfying, stable response to the paradoxes—not in general, and not for a minimalist about truth like Horwich.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/212344
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.723
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.703

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, JF-
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-21T02:33:07Z-
dc.date.available2015-07-21T02:33:07Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationSynthese, 2015, v. 192 n. 3, p. 679-699-
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/212344-
dc.description.abstractOne well known approach to the soritical paradoxes is epistemicism, the view that propositions involving vague notions have definite truth values, though it is impossible in principle to know what they are. Recently, Paul Horwich has extended this approach to the liar paradox, arguing that the liar proposition has a truth value, though it is impossible to know which one it is. The main virtue of the epistemicist approach is that it need not reject classical logic, and in particular the unrestricted acceptance of the principle of bivalence and law of excluded middle. Regardless of its success in solving the soritical paradoxes, the epistemicist approach faces a number of independent objections when it is applied to the liar paradox. I argue that the approach does not offer a satisfying, stable response to the paradoxes—not in general, and not for a minimalist about truth like Horwich.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0039-7857-
dc.relation.ispartofSynthese-
dc.rightsThe final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0596-x-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleEpistemicism and the Liar-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailAsay, JF: asay@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityAsay, JF=rp01955-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-014-0596-x-
dc.identifier.hkuros244391-
dc.identifier.volume192-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage679-
dc.identifier.epage699-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlands-

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