The compensation for land expropriation in rural China under the constitution in People's Republic of China

Abstract

Land has always been the focus of public debates among scholars, policy makers and local populations due to its scarcity in face of population explosion and rapid urban growth. This is particularly so in the case of China. In order to support an unprecedented rate of urbanization, the institutional mechanism of land expropriation has been widely adopted by the government of the People's Republic of China over the last three decades.

However, the effect of this institutional mechanism in rural China has become increasingly controversial. On one side, it is one of the most powerful tools to assemble land for urban development. Moreover, by means of land expropriation and land conveyance, local governments are capable of collecting substantial revenues to fund urban development. On the other side, the exclusive power of local governments over land expropriation, which is derived from the land management system, makes it possible for local governments to manipulate the price at which land is taken from farmers. In practice, local governments expropriate suburban or rural land at a low price and then lease it at a much higher price in land market. Therefore, inequitable compensation for land expropriation has led to numerous conflicts and social tensions between local governments and land-loss farmers. The issue of land expropriation and compensation has been identified as one of most primary sources of social discontents and complaints.

Even though a growing number of studies have been conducted on the urbanization and regional development in China, a thorough cause–effect elaboration of the issue of land expropriation and compensation in rural China has rarely been carried out within the political regime. This thesis analyzes the institutional framework of land expropriation and compensation in rural China from the perspectives of property rights and land management system. In addition, it discloses the opportunities for Chinese legal system to solve this issue by borrowing legal norms, wisdoms and experience from other jurisdiction, such as the United States and Germany. Furthermore, it aims to improve and reconstruct the legal framework of compensation by elaborating the concept of long-term reciprocity. Three primary questions would be elaborated in this thesis. Is the compensation for land expropriation in rural China equitable? If the compensation is not equitable, how has such an inequity been caused? And most importantly, how to improve the compensability of land expropriation?