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Conference Paper: Dominant bidding strategy in Mobile App advertising auction

TitleDominant bidding strategy in Mobile App advertising auction
Authors
KeywordsMobile App Advertising Auction
wGSP mechanism
Nash Equilibrium
Dominant Bidding Strategy
Issue Date2014
PublisherIEEE Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001525
Citation
The IEEE 11th International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE 2014), Guangzhou, China, 5-7 November 2014. In Conference Proceedings, 2014, p. 26-30 How to Cite?
AbstractThe widespread use of intelligent mobile phone has promoted prosperity of mobile App advertising in recent years. Based on existing bidding status, this paper presents the dominant bidding strategy for mobile advertising auction. Firstly, our study characterizes multiple Nash Equilibria resulting from different bidding strategies in wGSP (weighted Generalized Second-Price) auction. Further more, we prove that advertiser’s rank and utility will not decrease by using the dominant bidding strategy. We also consider the situation where the reserve price is set by the mobile advertising platform. It turns out that that advertiser’s payment will be no less than reserve price. Finally, a practical implementation for a virtual market simulates the dynamic bidding process in real world environments.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/203635
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWang, Len_US
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Yen_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, ZDen_US
dc.contributor.authorNing, L-
dc.contributor.authorCheng, Q-
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-19T15:49:08Z-
dc.date.available2014-09-19T15:49:08Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe IEEE 11th International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE 2014), Guangzhou, China, 5-7 November 2014. In Conference Proceedings, 2014, p. 26-30en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4799-6563-2-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/203635-
dc.description.abstractThe widespread use of intelligent mobile phone has promoted prosperity of mobile App advertising in recent years. Based on existing bidding status, this paper presents the dominant bidding strategy for mobile advertising auction. Firstly, our study characterizes multiple Nash Equilibria resulting from different bidding strategies in wGSP (weighted Generalized Second-Price) auction. Further more, we prove that advertiser’s rank and utility will not decrease by using the dominant bidding strategy. We also consider the situation where the reserve price is set by the mobile advertising platform. It turns out that that advertiser’s payment will be no less than reserve price. Finally, a practical implementation for a virtual market simulates the dynamic bidding process in real world environments.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherIEEE Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001525-
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE)en_US
dc.rightsIEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE). Copyright © IEEE Computer Society.-
dc.rights©2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectMobile App Advertising Auction-
dc.subjectwGSP mechanism-
dc.subjectNash Equilibrium-
dc.subjectDominant Bidding Strategy-
dc.titleDominant bidding strategy in Mobile App advertising auctionen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhang, Y: yongzh@hku.hken_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ICEBE.2014.17-
dc.identifier.hkuros237896en_US
dc.identifier.spage26-
dc.identifier.epage30-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 150112-

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