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Article: The Hard Road to Presentism

TitleThe Hard Road to Presentism
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PAPQ
Citation
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014, v. 95 n. 3, p. 314-335 How to Cite?
AbstractIt is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202212
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.294
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, JF-
dc.contributor.authorBaron, S-
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-22T02:57:48Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-22T02:57:48Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationPacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014, v. 95 n. 3, p. 314-335-
dc.identifier.issn0279-0750-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202212-
dc.description.abstractIt is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PAPQ-
dc.relation.ispartofPacific Philosophical Quarterly-
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleThe Hard Road to Presentism-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailAsay, JF: asay@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityAsay, JF=rp01955-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/papq.12029-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84926122022-
dc.identifier.hkuros244393-
dc.identifier.volume95-
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage314-
dc.identifier.epage335-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000342623700003-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-

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