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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/papq.12029
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84926122022
- WOS: WOS:000342623700003
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Article: The Hard Road to Presentism
Title | The Hard Road to Presentism |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2014 |
Publisher | Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PAPQ |
Citation | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014, v. 95 n. 3, p. 314-335 How to Cite? |
Abstract | It is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202212 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.7 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.769 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Asay, JF | - |
dc.contributor.author | Baron, S | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-22T02:57:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-22T02:57:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014, v. 95 n. 3, p. 314-335 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0279-0750 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202212 | - |
dc.description.abstract | It is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/PAPQ | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly | - |
dc.rights | The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com | - |
dc.title | The Hard Road to Presentism | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Asay, JF: asay@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Asay, JF=rp01955 | - |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/papq.12029 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84926122022 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 244393 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 95 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 314 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 335 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000342623700003 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0279-0750 | - |