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Article: Against Truth
Title | Against Truth |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2014 |
Citation | Erkenntnis, 2014, v. 79, n. 1, p. 147-164 How to Cite? |
Abstract | I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties (as universals, tropes, or natural classes). I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we're left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful (though primitive) concept. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202207 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.740 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Asay, Jamin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-22T02:57:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-22T02:57:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Erkenntnis, 2014, v. 79, n. 1, p. 147-164 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-0106 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202207 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties (as universals, tropes, or natural classes). I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we're left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful (though primitive) concept. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Erkenntnis | - |
dc.title | Against Truth | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10670-013-9483-y | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84893937727 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 79 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 147 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 164 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1572-8420 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000331382200010 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0165-0106 | - |