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Article: Against Truth

TitleAgainst Truth
Authors
Issue Date2014
Citation
Erkenntnis, 2014, v. 79, n. 1, p. 147-164 How to Cite?
AbstractI argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties (as universals, tropes, or natural classes). I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we're left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful (though primitive) concept. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202207
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.699
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, Jamin-
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-22T02:57:48Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-22T02:57:48Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationErkenntnis, 2014, v. 79, n. 1, p. 147-164-
dc.identifier.issn0165-0106-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202207-
dc.description.abstractI argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties (as universals, tropes, or natural classes). I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we're left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful (though primitive) concept. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofErkenntnis-
dc.titleAgainst Truth-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10670-013-9483-y-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84893937727-
dc.identifier.volume79-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage147-
dc.identifier.epage164-
dc.identifier.eissn1572-8420-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000331382200010-

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