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Article: Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism

TitleTruthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism
Authors
KeywordsMoral realism
Truth
Deflationism
Truthmaking
Quasi-realism
Issue Date2013
Citation
Philosophical Studies, 2013, v. 163, n. 1, p. 213-232 How to Cite?
AbstractCreeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I argue that moral realism is better understood instead as a metaphysical doctrine. As a result, we can usefully regiment the metaethical debate into one about moral truthmakers: In virtue of what are moral judgments true? I show how the notion of truthmaking has been simmering just below the surface of the metaethical debate, and how it reveals one metaethical view (quasi-realism) to be a stronger contender than the others. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202185
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.263
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, Jamin-
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-22T02:57:46Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-22T02:57:46Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophical Studies, 2013, v. 163, n. 1, p. 213-232-
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202185-
dc.description.abstractCreeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I argue that moral realism is better understood instead as a metaphysical doctrine. As a result, we can usefully regiment the metaethical debate into one about moral truthmakers: In virtue of what are moral judgments true? I show how the notion of truthmaking has been simmering just below the surface of the metaethical debate, and how it reveals one metaethical view (quasi-realism) to be a stronger contender than the others. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studies-
dc.subjectMoral realism-
dc.subjectTruth-
dc.subjectDeflationism-
dc.subjectTruthmaking-
dc.subjectQuasi-realism-
dc.titleTruthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-011-9808-0-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84875064791-
dc.identifier.volume163-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage213-
dc.identifier.epage232-
dc.identifier.eissn1573-0883-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000316392700020-

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