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- Publisher Website: 10.1080/02698595.2013.783971
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84885572736
- WOS: WOS:000325092600001
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Article: Three paradigms of scientific realism: A truthmaking account
Title | Three paradigms of scientific realism: A truthmaking account |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Citation | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2013, v. 27, n. 1, p. 1-21 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen's account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine's account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by any particular theory of truth. To be a scientific realist is to adopt a realism-relevant account of what makes true the scientific theories one accepts. The truthmaking approach restores realism's metaphysical core-distancing itself from linguistic conceptions of the debate-and thereby offers a better characterization of what is at stake in the question of scientific realism. © 2013 Open Society Foundation. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202171 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.7 2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.240 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Asay, Jamin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-22T02:57:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-22T02:57:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2013, v. 27, n. 1, p. 1-21 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0269-8595 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/202171 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen's account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine's account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by any particular theory of truth. To be a scientific realist is to adopt a realism-relevant account of what makes true the scientific theories one accepts. The truthmaking approach restores realism's metaphysical core-distancing itself from linguistic conceptions of the debate-and thereby offers a better characterization of what is at stake in the question of scientific realism. © 2013 Open Society Foundation. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Studies in the Philosophy of Science | - |
dc.title | Three paradigms of scientific realism: A truthmaking account | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/02698595.2013.783971 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84885572736 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 27 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 21 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1469-9281 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000325092600001 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0269-8595 | - |