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Article: Three paradigms of scientific realism: A truthmaking account

TitleThree paradigms of scientific realism: A truthmaking account
Authors
Issue Date2013
Citation
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2013, v. 27, n. 1, p. 1-21 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen's account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine's account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by any particular theory of truth. To be a scientific realist is to adopt a realism-relevant account of what makes true the scientific theories one accepts. The truthmaking approach restores realism's metaphysical core-distancing itself from linguistic conceptions of the debate-and thereby offers a better characterization of what is at stake in the question of scientific realism. © 2013 Open Society Foundation.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202171
ISSN
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.263
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, Jamin-
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-22T02:57:45Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-22T02:57:45Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2013, v. 27, n. 1, p. 1-21-
dc.identifier.issn0269-8595-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202171-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen's account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine's account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by any particular theory of truth. To be a scientific realist is to adopt a realism-relevant account of what makes true the scientific theories one accepts. The truthmaking approach restores realism's metaphysical core-distancing itself from linguistic conceptions of the debate-and thereby offers a better characterization of what is at stake in the question of scientific realism. © 2013 Open Society Foundation.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science-
dc.titleThree paradigms of scientific realism: A truthmaking account-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/02698595.2013.783971-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84885572736-
dc.identifier.volume27-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage21-
dc.identifier.eissn1469-9281-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000325092600001-

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