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Article: Constructive empiricism and deflationary truth

TitleConstructive empiricism and deflationary truth
Authors
Issue Date2009
Citation
Philosophy of Science, 2009, v. 76, n. 4, p. 423-443 How to Cite?
AbstractConstructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth and empirical adequacy the constructive empiricist must offer and then show why deflationists cannot uphold such an account. Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science Association.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202142
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.128
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.017

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsay, Jamin-
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-22T02:57:43Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-22T02:57:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy of Science, 2009, v. 76, n. 4, p. 423-443-
dc.identifier.issn0031-8248-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/202142-
dc.description.abstractConstructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. Deflationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts. Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate what sort of account of truth and empirical adequacy the constructive empiricist must offer and then show why deflationists cannot uphold such an account. Copyright 2009 by the Philosophy of Science Association.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy of Science-
dc.titleConstructive empiricism and deflationary truth-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/648064-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-77149143916-
dc.identifier.volume76-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage423-
dc.identifier.epage443-

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