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Article: An Adaptive Prediction-regret Driven Strategy for One-shot Bilateral Bargaining Software Agents

TitleAn Adaptive Prediction-regret Driven Strategy for One-shot Bilateral Bargaining Software Agents
Authors
Issue Date2015
PublisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eswa
Citation
Expert Systems With Applications, 2015, v. 42 n. 1, p. 411-425 How to Cite?
AbstractBargaining is a popular paradigm to solve the problem of resource allocation. Factors such as complexity of dynamic environment, bounded rationality of negotiators, time constraints and incomplete information, make the design of optimal automated bargaining strategies difficult. Currently, most bargaining strategies are designed under the assumption that opponents offer according to specific models. Therefore, most of them focus on modeling opponents or predict opponents’ private information such as reserve price, deadline, or the probabilities of different behaviors. Without model opponents, this paper presents an adaptive prediction-regret driven negotiation strategy for bilateral one-shot price bargaining, which extends the existing heuristic method of “looking forward” into “looking forward and reviewing the past” pattern by the regret principle in psychology. Four sets of experiments are designed and implemented to verify the general performance of this strategy. Results show that this strategy outperforms the strategies that model opponents and existing adaptive strategy when bargaining with multifarious opponents who offer according to pure consecutive concession strategies, sit-and-wait strategy, fixed mixture strategies, random mixture strategies, or even intelligent strategies.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200981

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorJi, SJen_US
dc.contributor.authorLeung, HFen_US
dc.contributor.authorSim, KMen_US
dc.contributor.authorLiang, YQen_US
dc.contributor.authorChiu, KWDen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-21T07:08:47Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-21T07:08:47Z-
dc.date.issued2015-
dc.identifier.citationExpert Systems With Applications, 2015, v. 42 n. 1, p. 411-425en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200981-
dc.description.abstractBargaining is a popular paradigm to solve the problem of resource allocation. Factors such as complexity of dynamic environment, bounded rationality of negotiators, time constraints and incomplete information, make the design of optimal automated bargaining strategies difficult. Currently, most bargaining strategies are designed under the assumption that opponents offer according to specific models. Therefore, most of them focus on modeling opponents or predict opponents’ private information such as reserve price, deadline, or the probabilities of different behaviors. Without model opponents, this paper presents an adaptive prediction-regret driven negotiation strategy for bilateral one-shot price bargaining, which extends the existing heuristic method of “looking forward” into “looking forward and reviewing the past” pattern by the regret principle in psychology. Four sets of experiments are designed and implemented to verify the general performance of this strategy. Results show that this strategy outperforms the strategies that model opponents and existing adaptive strategy when bargaining with multifarious opponents who offer according to pure consecutive concession strategies, sit-and-wait strategy, fixed mixture strategies, random mixture strategies, or even intelligent strategies.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eswaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofExpert Systems With Applicationsen_US
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in <Journal title>. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL#, ISSUE#, (DATE)] DOI#en_US
dc.titleAn Adaptive Prediction-regret Driven Strategy for One-shot Bilateral Bargaining Software Agentsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChiu, KWD: dchiu88@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.eswa.2014.07.022-
dc.identifier.hkuros232069en_US

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