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Article: Constructivism and Reflexive Constitution-Making Practices

TitleConstructivism and Reflexive Constitution-Making Practices
Authors
Issue Date2013
Citation
Raisons Politiques, 2013, v. 51, p. 63-80 How to Cite?
AbstractThe practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course between egalitarian liberal cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and statism and nationalism, on the other. In so doing, it seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. In this paper, I argue, however, that the “practice turn” in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Methodologically, it is necessary to move beyond the residual positivism of the practice-dependent approach to an interpretive approach that takes account of the reflexive, developmental nature of social practices. Substantively, focusing on the reflexivity of social practices, and particularly practices of reflexive constitution-making, provides a framework for a republican approach to international justice concerned with reconciling Kant’s idea of the universality of justice with the emphasis on popular sovereignty of Rousseau and Hegel.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200820

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGledhill, JSen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-21T07:02:19Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-21T07:02:19Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationRaisons Politiques, 2013, v. 51, p. 63-80en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200820-
dc.description.abstractThe practice-dependent approach to global justice makes a welcome attempt to steer a course between egalitarian liberal cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and statism and nationalism, on the other. In so doing, it seeks to reconcile the universality of justice with the particular role principles of justice play within the context of different social practices. In this paper, I argue, however, that the “practice turn” in theorising about justice has not gone far enough, either methodologically or substantively. Methodologically, it is necessary to move beyond the residual positivism of the practice-dependent approach to an interpretive approach that takes account of the reflexive, developmental nature of social practices. Substantively, focusing on the reflexivity of social practices, and particularly practices of reflexive constitution-making, provides a framework for a republican approach to international justice concerned with reconciling Kant’s idea of the universality of justice with the emphasis on popular sovereignty of Rousseau and Hegel.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofRaisons Politiquesen_US
dc.titleConstructivism and Reflexive Constitution-Making Practicesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailGledhill, JS: gledhill@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityGledhill, JS=rp01783en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3917/rai.051.0063en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros235035en_US
dc.identifier.volume51en_US
dc.identifier.spage63en_US
dc.identifier.epage80en_US

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