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Article: The Soft Law Nature of Basel III and International Financial Regulations

TitleThe Soft Law Nature of Basel III and International Financial Regulations
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherSweet & Maxwell.
Citation
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2014, v. 29 n. 10, p. 603-612 How to Cite?
AbstractThe global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 to 2009 prompted international soft law institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), to streamline the governance of internationally active banks by imposing upon them new capital requirements through Basel III which has both micro-prudential and macro-prudential aspects. Although Basel III is shaped by and embodies the response to the GFC of 2007 to 2009 by the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from the world’s 20 major economies (G20), Basel III does not have legally binding effect (as it was so devised)); but the G20 operates through transnational regulatory networks (TRNs) which comprise many international standard-setting bodies. This article explains and analyses why the pursuit of the common good in political economies by participants in TRNs, international financial regulations in general and Basel III in particular will facilitate greater convergence in supervisory practices and deepen cooperation between supervisory authorities.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200645
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLee, EHen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-21T06:53:35Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-21T06:53:35Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2014, v. 29 n. 10, p. 603-612en_US
dc.identifier.issn0267-937X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200645-
dc.description.abstractThe global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007 to 2009 prompted international soft law institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), to streamline the governance of internationally active banks by imposing upon them new capital requirements through Basel III which has both micro-prudential and macro-prudential aspects. Although Basel III is shaped by and embodies the response to the GFC of 2007 to 2009 by the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from the world’s 20 major economies (G20), Basel III does not have legally binding effect (as it was so devised)); but the G20 operates through transnational regulatory networks (TRNs) which comprise many international standard-setting bodies. This article explains and analyses why the pursuit of the common good in political economies by participants in TRNs, international financial regulations in general and Basel III in particular will facilitate greater convergence in supervisory practices and deepen cooperation between supervisory authorities.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSweet & Maxwell.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of International Banking Law and Regulationen_US
dc.titleThe Soft Law Nature of Basel III and International Financial Regulationsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailLee, EH: eleelaw@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLee, EH=rp01257en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros235061en_US
dc.identifier.volume29en_US
dc.identifier.issue10en_US
dc.identifier.spage603en_US
dc.identifier.epage612en_US
dc.publisher.placeThe United Kingdomen_US

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