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Article: China as a regulatory state

TitleChina as a regulatory state
Authors
KeywordsRegulatory state
Disorder costs
Dictatorship costs
Market economy models
China's economic reform
Issue Date2009
PublisherBank of Finland. Institute for Economies in Transition
Citation
BOFIT Discussion Papers, 2009, Working Papers Series, paper no. 17/2009 How to Cite?
AbstractMarket economy models differ in the degree of the power of the government vis-à-vis the market in the economy. Under the classifications set forth by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov et al. (2003), these market models range from those emphasizing low government intervention in the market (private orderings and private litigation through courts) to those where the state is an active participant (regulatory state). This paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of the government vis-à-vis the market. Regional government power is found to vary considerably across China's regions. Notably, enterprises located in regions where government exerts more power in the market perform better, suggesting that the regulatory state model of the market economy is appropriate for China.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200280
ISSN
SSRN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDu, J-
dc.contributor.authorLu, Y-
dc.contributor.authorTao, Z-
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-04T03:49:24Z-
dc.date.available2014-08-04T03:49:24Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.citationBOFIT Discussion Papers, 2009, Working Papers Series, paper no. 17/2009-
dc.identifier.issn1456-5889-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/200280-
dc.description.abstractMarket economy models differ in the degree of the power of the government vis-à-vis the market in the economy. Under the classifications set forth by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov et al. (2003), these market models range from those emphasizing low government intervention in the market (private orderings and private litigation through courts) to those where the state is an active participant (regulatory state). This paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of the government vis-à-vis the market. Regional government power is found to vary considerably across China's regions. Notably, enterprises located in regions where government exerts more power in the market perform better, suggesting that the regulatory state model of the market economy is appropriate for China.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherBank of Finland. Institute for Economies in Transition-
dc.relation.ispartofBOFIT Discussion Papers-
dc.subjectRegulatory state-
dc.subjectDisorder costs-
dc.subjectDictatorship costs-
dc.subjectMarket economy models-
dc.subjectChina's economic reform-
dc.titleChina as a regulatory stateen_US
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailLu, Y: xzhongkanson@business.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hk-
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.1489412-
dc.publisher.placeFinland-
dc.identifier.ssrn1489412-
dc.customcontrol.immutablesml 140804-

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