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Article: Regulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector

TitleRegulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector
Authors
KeywordsTelecommunications
Regulation
Corruption
Issue Date2012
PublisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01475967
Citation
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2012, v. 40 n. 1, p. 22-43 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that (1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; (2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; (3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and (4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192340
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.38
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.066
SSRN
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBerg, SVen_US
dc.contributor.authorJiang, Len_US
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-24T01:50:03Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-24T01:50:03Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Comparative Economics, 2012, v. 40 n. 1, p. 22-43en_US
dc.identifier.issn0147-5967en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192340-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that (1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; (2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; (3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and (4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01475967-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Comparative Economicsen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Comparative Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL 40, ISSUE 1, (2012)] DOI 10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.001-
dc.subjectTelecommunications-
dc.subjectRegulation-
dc.subjectCorruption-
dc.titleRegulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sectoren_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.001en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84856212058en_US
dc.identifier.volume40en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.spage22en_US
dc.identifier.epage43en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000300862800002-
dc.identifier.ssrn1714451-

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