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Article: Executive pay at publicly listed firms in China

TitleExecutive pay at publicly listed firms in China
Authors
Issue Date2011
Citation
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2011, v. 59 n. 2, p. 417-436 How to Cite?
AbstractThis article explores the executive compensation structure in China. Using unbalanced panel data on 17,178 executives in 1,386 publicly listed firms in China during 1999–2006, we find that (1) both executive pay and the pay gap between executive ranks increased over time; (2) pay distribution skews toward the top of the firm, with the pay gap between the CEO and the second-tier executives (vice presidents) being the largest; (3) the pay gap between the CEO and vice presidents increases with the number of vice presidents; (4) executive pay dispersion is positively related to the variation in firm performance; and (5) executive pay is negatively related to state ownership. Overall, our study shows that the executive pay structure at publicly listed firms in China has started to resemble that seen in developed market economies. This development represents an important change from the egalitarian ideology that prevailed before the economic reforms.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192334
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.392
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.698
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorShen, Wen_US
dc.contributor.authorSu, Den_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-24T01:50:00Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-24T01:50:00Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Development and Cultural Change, 2011, v. 59 n. 2, p. 417-436en_US
dc.identifier.issn0013-0079en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192334-
dc.description.abstractThis article explores the executive compensation structure in China. Using unbalanced panel data on 17,178 executives in 1,386 publicly listed firms in China during 1999–2006, we find that (1) both executive pay and the pay gap between executive ranks increased over time; (2) pay distribution skews toward the top of the firm, with the pay gap between the CEO and the second-tier executives (vice presidents) being the largest; (3) the pay gap between the CEO and vice presidents increases with the number of vice presidents; (4) executive pay dispersion is positively related to the variation in firm performance; and (5) executive pay is negatively related to state ownership. Overall, our study shows that the executive pay structure at publicly listed firms in China has started to resemble that seen in developed market economies. This development represents an important change from the egalitarian ideology that prevailed before the economic reforms.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Development and Cultural Changeen_US
dc.titleExecutive pay at publicly listed firms in Chinaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/649642en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-78650765866en_US
dc.identifier.volume59en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.spage417en_US
dc.identifier.epage436en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000285410400006-

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