File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Regulation of state-owned and privatized utilities: Ukraine electricity distribution company performance

TitleRegulation of state-owned and privatized utilities: Ukraine electricity distribution company performance
Authors
KeywordsData envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)
Incentive regulation
State-owned and privatized utilities
Issue Date2005
PublisherSpringer. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.com/journal/11149
Citation
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005, v. 28 n. 3, p. 259-287 How to Cite?
AbstractBoth ownership and regulation affect the behavior of utility managers. Private ownership rewards managerial decisions that enhance shareholder value. Regulatory incentives reward behavior that affects profits and costs. An empirical analysis of 24 Ukraine electricity distribution companies from 1998 to 2002 indicates that privately owned firms do respond to incentives that add to net cash flows (associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network losses). However, they also respond more aggressively than do state-owned distribution utilities to mark-up (cost-plus) regulatory incentives that increase shareholder value but decrease cost efficiency.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192323
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.864
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.759
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBerg, Sen_US
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorTsaplin, Ven_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-24T01:49:56Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-24T01:49:56Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Regulatory Economics, 2005, v. 28 n. 3, p. 259-287en_US
dc.identifier.issn0922-680Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/192323-
dc.description.abstractBoth ownership and regulation affect the behavior of utility managers. Private ownership rewards managerial decisions that enhance shareholder value. Regulatory incentives reward behavior that affects profits and costs. An empirical analysis of 24 Ukraine electricity distribution companies from 1998 to 2002 indicates that privately owned firms do respond to incentives that add to net cash flows (associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network losses). However, they also respond more aggressively than do state-owned distribution utilities to mark-up (cost-plus) regulatory incentives that increase shareholder value but decrease cost efficiency.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.com/journal/11149-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Regulatory Economicsen_US
dc.subjectData envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)-
dc.subjectIncentive regulation-
dc.subjectState-owned and privatized utilities-
dc.titleRegulation of state-owned and privatized utilities: Ukraine electricity distribution company performanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11149-005-3957-zen_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-26244461392en_US
dc.identifier.volume28en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.spage259en_US
dc.identifier.epage287en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000232373200002-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats