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postgraduate thesis: Peer-to-peer system design: incentives and evolution of cooperation

TitlePeer-to-peer system design: incentives and evolution of cooperation
Authors
Advisors
Advisor(s):Kwok, YK
Issue Date2013
PublisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)
Citation
Jin, X. [靳鑫]. (2013). Peer-to-peer system design : incentives and evolution of cooperation. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5066223
AbstractThe persistence of cooperation is a longstanding problem in the social and biological sciences. Recent advances of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks manifest as a promising platform to experiment and contribute to theories and algorithms on cooperation. In this thesis, by and large, we view P2P systems as an economy in which incentives are critical to stimulate contribution. Indeed, a P2P system can be considered as a society where different behaviors can emerge, and an empirical platform to understand cooperation and mimic evolving population. Specifically, we consider the problem of cooperation from two perspectives. First and foremost, autonomous nodes are strategic and selfish, who are reluctant to cooperate solely for public good. We investigate incentive scheme design for cooperation in P2P live media streaming networks. The general approach of protocol decomposition shows that practical incentives can only be guaranteed by efficient peer selection, due to stringent playback deadlines. Striker strategy is then proposed so as to align the optimal peer selection of heterogeneous nodes with social welfare maximization, the efficiency of which is validated by repeated game modeling and extensive simulations. The hidden philosophy is to coerce non-cooperative peers into cooperation by collectively implementing punishment threats. This is analogous to strikes and coercion implemented by organizations like unions in human society. On the other hand, just as node selfishness, competition and struggle for survival raise another problem for cooperation. Similar to human society and biological systems, we envision that diverse strategies—some are more exploitative, while others more altruistic—could be deployed by selfish participants to compete against interacting nodes and gain performance advantages. In such a variegated environment, our coevolutionary perspective aims to understand cooperation and rationalize the coexistence and success of diverse behaviors. Population games and evolutionary game theory provide analytical tractability, while learning and evolutionary dynamics are proposed to evolve strategies.
DegreeDoctor of Philosophy
SubjectPeer-to-peer architecture (Computer networks)
Dept/ProgramElectrical and Electronic Engineering
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/191198

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.advisorKwok, YK-
dc.contributor.authorJin, Xin-
dc.contributor.author靳鑫-
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-30T15:52:31Z-
dc.date.available2013-09-30T15:52:31Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationJin, X. [靳鑫]. (2013). Peer-to-peer system design : incentives and evolution of cooperation. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5066223-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/191198-
dc.description.abstractThe persistence of cooperation is a longstanding problem in the social and biological sciences. Recent advances of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks manifest as a promising platform to experiment and contribute to theories and algorithms on cooperation. In this thesis, by and large, we view P2P systems as an economy in which incentives are critical to stimulate contribution. Indeed, a P2P system can be considered as a society where different behaviors can emerge, and an empirical platform to understand cooperation and mimic evolving population. Specifically, we consider the problem of cooperation from two perspectives. First and foremost, autonomous nodes are strategic and selfish, who are reluctant to cooperate solely for public good. We investigate incentive scheme design for cooperation in P2P live media streaming networks. The general approach of protocol decomposition shows that practical incentives can only be guaranteed by efficient peer selection, due to stringent playback deadlines. Striker strategy is then proposed so as to align the optimal peer selection of heterogeneous nodes with social welfare maximization, the efficiency of which is validated by repeated game modeling and extensive simulations. The hidden philosophy is to coerce non-cooperative peers into cooperation by collectively implementing punishment threats. This is analogous to strikes and coercion implemented by organizations like unions in human society. On the other hand, just as node selfishness, competition and struggle for survival raise another problem for cooperation. Similar to human society and biological systems, we envision that diverse strategies—some are more exploitative, while others more altruistic—could be deployed by selfish participants to compete against interacting nodes and gain performance advantages. In such a variegated environment, our coevolutionary perspective aims to understand cooperation and rationalize the coexistence and success of diverse behaviors. Population games and evolutionary game theory provide analytical tractability, while learning and evolutionary dynamics are proposed to evolve strategies.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherThe University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong)-
dc.relation.ispartofHKU Theses Online (HKUTO)-
dc.rightsThe author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights) and the right to use in future works.-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.source.urihttp://hub.hku.hk/bib/B50662235-
dc.subject.lcshPeer-to-peer architecture (Computer networks)-
dc.titlePeer-to-peer system design: incentives and evolution of cooperation-
dc.typePG_Thesis-
dc.identifier.hkulb5066223-
dc.description.thesisnameDoctor of Philosophy-
dc.description.thesislevelDoctoral-
dc.description.thesisdisciplineElectrical and Electronic Engineering-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.5353/th_b5066223-
dc.date.hkucongregation2013-

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