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Article: Interjurisdictional Cooperation through Bargaining: The Case of the Guangzhou–Zhuhai Railway in the Pearl River Delta, China

TitleInterjurisdictional Cooperation through Bargaining: The Case of the Guangzhou–Zhuhai Railway in the Pearl River Delta, China
Authors
Issue Date2013
PublisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY
Citation
The China Quarterly, 2013, v. 213, p. 130-151 How to Cite?
AbstractInterjurisdictional cooperation has emerged as a major recent trend in China in response to challenges from market reforms and globalization. However, given that cities are in fierce competition with one another, interjurisdictional cooperation presents many difficulties for policy making. This paper attempts to examine how cooperative partnerships can be developed, sustained, or even resisted. It uses the Guangzhou-Zhuhai Railway as a case study to explore the institutional configuration of such a practice and to understand how the historical contingencies and path-dependencies in a transitional society interact with intensive bargaining to influence partnership building. It argues that the lack of a formal institutional framework to facilitate horizontal networking forces actors to opt for ad hoc collaborative arrangements. With the objective of making joint projects workable, commitments for cooperation have to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis through extensive bargaining. Although this creates much flexibility in consensus building, it does not guarantee success: success depends on the interplay of inter-ministry politics, interscalar relations, intercity politics and state-market relations. To a certain extent, the Chinese state can go beyond economic logic and shore up its legitimacy by prioritizing development. The post-reform path-dependencies can provide current political leaders with more rather than fewer instruments with which to negotiate interjurisdictional projects, and thus have greater influence over urban and regional economic governance. © 2013 The China Quarterly.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/190530
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.54
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.058
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXu, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorYeh, AGOen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-17T15:27:03Z-
dc.date.available2013-09-17T15:27:03Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe China Quarterly, 2013, v. 213, p. 130-151en_US
dc.identifier.issn0305-7410en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/190530-
dc.description.abstractInterjurisdictional cooperation has emerged as a major recent trend in China in response to challenges from market reforms and globalization. However, given that cities are in fierce competition with one another, interjurisdictional cooperation presents many difficulties for policy making. This paper attempts to examine how cooperative partnerships can be developed, sustained, or even resisted. It uses the Guangzhou-Zhuhai Railway as a case study to explore the institutional configuration of such a practice and to understand how the historical contingencies and path-dependencies in a transitional society interact with intensive bargaining to influence partnership building. It argues that the lack of a formal institutional framework to facilitate horizontal networking forces actors to opt for ad hoc collaborative arrangements. With the objective of making joint projects workable, commitments for cooperation have to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis through extensive bargaining. Although this creates much flexibility in consensus building, it does not guarantee success: success depends on the interplay of inter-ministry politics, interscalar relations, intercity politics and state-market relations. To a certain extent, the Chinese state can go beyond economic logic and shore up its legitimacy by prioritizing development. The post-reform path-dependencies can provide current political leaders with more rather than fewer instruments with which to negotiate interjurisdictional projects, and thus have greater influence over urban and regional economic governance. © 2013 The China Quarterly.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofThe China Quarterlyen_US
dc.rightsThe China Quarterly. Copyright © Cambridge University Press.en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleInterjurisdictional Cooperation through Bargaining: The Case of the Guangzhou–Zhuhai Railway in the Pearl River Delta, Chinaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailYeh, AGO: hdxugoy@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityYeh, AGO=rp01033en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0305741013000283-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84875522525-
dc.identifier.hkuros224953en_US
dc.identifier.volume213en_US
dc.identifier.spage130en_US
dc.identifier.epage151en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000316641500007-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US

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