File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: Friend or foe? The role of state and mutual Fund ownership in the split share structure reform in China

TitleFriend or foe? The role of state and mutual Fund ownership in the split share structure reform in China
Authors
Issue Date2010
PublisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=jfq
Citation
Journal Of Financial And Quantitative Analysis, 2010, v. 45 n. 3, p. 685-706 How to Cite?
AbstractThe recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight. Copyright © 2010 Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188465
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.628
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.998
SSRN
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFirth, Men_US
dc.contributor.authorLin, Cen_US
dc.contributor.authorZou, Hen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-03T04:07:44Z-
dc.date.available2013-09-03T04:07:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Financial And Quantitative Analysis, 2010, v. 45 n. 3, p. 685-706en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1090en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188465-
dc.description.abstractThe recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight. Copyright © 2010 Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=jfqen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysisen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleFriend or foe? The role of state and mutual Fund ownership in the split share structure reform in Chinaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZou, H: hongzou@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZou, H=rp01800en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0022109010000190en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-78650283089en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-78650283089&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume45en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.spage685en_US
dc.identifier.epage706en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000281322200006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn1555451-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridFirth, M=7006574464en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLin, C=25630694300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZou, H=48663306300en_US

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats