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Article: The corporate purchase of property insurance: Chinese evidence

TitleThe corporate purchase of property insurance: Chinese evidence
Authors
KeywordsAgency Theory
Corporate Sector
People's Republic Of China
Property Insurance
Issue Date2006
PublisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfi
Citation
Journal Of Financial Intermediation, 2006, v. 15 n. 2, p. 165-196 How to Cite?
AbstractUsing a panel data set (1997-1999) for 235 publicly listed companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC), this study tests empirically whether the purchase of property insurance mitigates principal-agent (agency) incentive conflicts. In contrast to prior studies, we first estimate a probit insurance participation decision model and then a fixed-effects insurance volume decision model (with Heckman's sample selection correction) in order to shed light on the determinants of both property insurance participation and volume decisions. Our results suggest that a major motivation for the corporate purchase of insurance in China appears to be the mitigation of agency conflicts. Additionally, various ownerships seem to have different impacts on the corporate purchase of insurance in China. Moreover, the results show that the same factor can have different impacts on the insurance participation and volume decisions, and that binding financial conditions may be a key factor accounting for such observed differences. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188450
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.145
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.861
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZou, Hen_US
dc.contributor.authorAdams, MBen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-03T04:07:37Z-
dc.date.available2013-09-03T04:07:37Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Financial Intermediation, 2006, v. 15 n. 2, p. 165-196en_US
dc.identifier.issn1042-9573en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188450-
dc.description.abstractUsing a panel data set (1997-1999) for 235 publicly listed companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC), this study tests empirically whether the purchase of property insurance mitigates principal-agent (agency) incentive conflicts. In contrast to prior studies, we first estimate a probit insurance participation decision model and then a fixed-effects insurance volume decision model (with Heckman's sample selection correction) in order to shed light on the determinants of both property insurance participation and volume decisions. Our results suggest that a major motivation for the corporate purchase of insurance in China appears to be the mitigation of agency conflicts. Additionally, various ownerships seem to have different impacts on the corporate purchase of insurance in China. Moreover, the results show that the same factor can have different impacts on the insurance participation and volume decisions, and that binding financial conditions may be a key factor accounting for such observed differences. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfien_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial Intermediationen_US
dc.subjectAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Sectoren_US
dc.subjectPeople's Republic Of Chinaen_US
dc.subjectProperty Insuranceen_US
dc.titleThe corporate purchase of property insurance: Chinese evidenceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZou, H: hongzou@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZou, H=rp01800en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jfi.2004.06.007en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-33644807925en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-33644807925&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume15en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.spage165en_US
dc.identifier.epage196en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000236491900001-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZou, H=12769328900en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridAdams, MB=7403905632en_US

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