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Article: Do Severe Penalties Deter Corruption? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Chinese Case

TitleDo Severe Penalties Deter Corruption? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Chinese Case
嚴刑能遏制腐敗嗎?-以中國為例的博弈論分析
Authors
KeywordsCorruption (腐敗)
Rule of Law (法治)
Severe Penalty (嚴刑)
Game Theory (博弈論)
Issue Date2013
PublisherJing ji she hui ti zhi bi jiao bian ji bu (經濟社會體制比較編輯部).
Citation
Comparative Economic & Social Systems, 2013, n. 2, p. 141-154 How to Cite?
經濟社會體制比較, 2013, n. 2, p. 141-154 How to Cite?
AbstractSevere punishments,including the death penalty,have not effectively deterred corruption in China.This research argues that deterrence of corruption has been ineffective from a game-theoretic perspective.I first form a corruption investigation game based on Tsebelis’s model of crimes and sanctions.Next I extend the basic model by linking the two players’ payoffs.Finally,I construct a static game of incomplete information and use it to consider different types of investigators.With the unique advantages of game theory,this research finds that to deter corruption,(1) simply increasing the penalty can counterintuitively decrease the frequency of investigation without decreasing the occurrence of corruption;(2) it is important to increase incentives for the investigator,such as rewarding anticorruption monetarily or politically;and(3) it is also important to have a sufficient proportion of officials who have an incentive to fight corruption.
盡管中國對腐敗的懲處有諸如死刑之類的嚴刑,但腐敗仍未得到有效遏制。本研究從博弈論的視角探討了腐敗未得到有效控制的原因。文章基于塞貝利斯(Tsebelis)關于犯罪與懲罰的模型構建了一個腐敗—調查的博弈論模型,而后通過假定博弈雙方的利益相關對此模型進行了拓展。考慮到官員們對反腐的態度不同,文章最后構建了一個不完全信息的靜態博弈模型。借助于博弈論分析方法的獨特優勢,文章研究發現了影響腐敗控制的三個因素:1.簡單地加大處罰不僅未必能減少腐敗反而會減少對腐敗的調查;2.提高反腐人員的激勵對遏制腐敗很重要,比如提高他們在反腐工作中的經濟和政治利益;3.同樣重要的是,要有一支能積極主動反腐的官員隊伍。
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/187829
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Jen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-21T07:15:41Z-
dc.date.available2013-08-21T07:15:41Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationComparative Economic & Social Systems, 2013, n. 2, p. 141-154en_US
dc.identifier.citation經濟社會體制比較, 2013, n. 2, p. 141-154-
dc.identifier.issn1003-3947-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/187829-
dc.description.abstractSevere punishments,including the death penalty,have not effectively deterred corruption in China.This research argues that deterrence of corruption has been ineffective from a game-theoretic perspective.I first form a corruption investigation game based on Tsebelis’s model of crimes and sanctions.Next I extend the basic model by linking the two players’ payoffs.Finally,I construct a static game of incomplete information and use it to consider different types of investigators.With the unique advantages of game theory,this research finds that to deter corruption,(1) simply increasing the penalty can counterintuitively decrease the frequency of investigation without decreasing the occurrence of corruption;(2) it is important to increase incentives for the investigator,such as rewarding anticorruption monetarily or politically;and(3) it is also important to have a sufficient proportion of officials who have an incentive to fight corruption.-
dc.description.abstract盡管中國對腐敗的懲處有諸如死刑之類的嚴刑,但腐敗仍未得到有效遏制。本研究從博弈論的視角探討了腐敗未得到有效控制的原因。文章基于塞貝利斯(Tsebelis)關于犯罪與懲罰的模型構建了一個腐敗—調查的博弈論模型,而后通過假定博弈雙方的利益相關對此模型進行了拓展。考慮到官員們對反腐的態度不同,文章最后構建了一個不完全信息的靜態博弈模型。借助于博弈論分析方法的獨特優勢,文章研究發現了影響腐敗控制的三個因素:1.簡單地加大處罰不僅未必能減少腐敗反而會減少對腐敗的調查;2.提高反腐人員的激勵對遏制腐敗很重要,比如提高他們在反腐工作中的經濟和政治利益;3.同樣重要的是,要有一支能積極主動反腐的官員隊伍。-
dc.languagechien_US
dc.publisherJing ji she hui ti zhi bi jiao bian ji bu (經濟社會體制比較編輯部).en_US
dc.relation.ispartofComparative Economic & Social Systemsen_US
dc.relation.ispartof經濟社會體制比較-
dc.subjectCorruption (腐敗)-
dc.subjectRule of Law (法治)-
dc.subjectSevere Penalty (嚴刑)-
dc.subjectGame Theory (博弈論)-
dc.titleDo Severe Penalties Deter Corruption? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Chinese Caseen_US
dc.title嚴刑能遏制腐敗嗎?-以中國為例的博弈論分析-
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhu, J: zhujn@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhu, J=rp01624en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros219746en_US
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage141-
dc.identifier.epage154-
dc.publisher.placeBeijing (北京)en_US

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