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Article: Entry, reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement

TitleEntry, reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement
Authors
KeywordsD82
F10
F12
F23
Issue Date2014
PublisherBlackwell Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/CJE
Citation
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2014 How to Cite?
AbstractWe examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinational's incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare. The multinational's incentive to innovate may be inversely U-shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/187610
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.5
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.701

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChe, J-
dc.contributor.authorQiu, LD-
dc.contributor.authorZhou, W-
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-21T07:05:18Z-
dc.date.available2013-08-21T07:05:18Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationCanadian Journal of Economics, 2014-
dc.identifier.issn0008-4085-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/187610-
dc.description.abstractWe examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinational's incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare. The multinational's incentive to innovate may be inversely U-shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/CJE-
dc.relation.ispartofCanadian Journal of Economics-
dc.rightsThe definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectD82-
dc.subjectF10-
dc.subjectF12-
dc.subjectF23-
dc.titleEntry, reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailQiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailZhou, W: wzhou@business.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityQiu, LD=rp01093-
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, W=rp01128-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/caje.12104-
dc.identifier.hkuros216823-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

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