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Article: Are some planning transactions intrinsically sovereign?

TitleAre some planning transactions intrinsically sovereign?
Authors
KeywordsDevelopment Control
Enforcement
Incomplete Contracting
Land-Use Regulation
Planning
Probity
Sovereign Transactions
Transaction Costs
Zoning
Issue Date2009
PublisherSage Publications, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.com/journal.aspx?pid=243
Citation
Journal Of Planning Education And Research, 2009, v. 28 n. 4, p. 476-490 How to Cite?
AbstractThe laws, policies, customary practices and other institutions that govern a country's land development and the pattern of its spatial economy are constantly evolving. They change at the margin and by catastrophe; involving major land reform, minor statutes, economic crises, and gradual shifts in the way things are done. This article analyses the institutions of planning using qualitative models of incomplete contracting. It portrays them as fluid social constructs that adapt according to the relative costs of organizing the transactions that constitute a planning service. The focus is on the way organizational and institutional structures influence and are determined by post-contractual hazards. Post-contractual hazards are risks to the desired outcome of a transaction (for example the risk that a commissioned plan proves to be unworkable or irrelevant). Attention is specifically drawn to probity hazard (following economist Oliver Williamson, 1999). A set of core planning functions (transactions) are examined with the purpose of discovering if there are a priori arguments for retaining certain parts of a planning system within the public bureaucracy. © 2009 Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/183455
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.051
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.400
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWebster, CJen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-27T08:38:10Z-
dc.date.available2013-05-27T08:38:10Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Planning Education And Research, 2009, v. 28 n. 4, p. 476-490en_US
dc.identifier.issn0739-456Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/183455-
dc.description.abstractThe laws, policies, customary practices and other institutions that govern a country's land development and the pattern of its spatial economy are constantly evolving. They change at the margin and by catastrophe; involving major land reform, minor statutes, economic crises, and gradual shifts in the way things are done. This article analyses the institutions of planning using qualitative models of incomplete contracting. It portrays them as fluid social constructs that adapt according to the relative costs of organizing the transactions that constitute a planning service. The focus is on the way organizational and institutional structures influence and are determined by post-contractual hazards. Post-contractual hazards are risks to the desired outcome of a transaction (for example the risk that a commissioned plan proves to be unworkable or irrelevant). Attention is specifically drawn to probity hazard (following economist Oliver Williamson, 1999). A set of core planning functions (transactions) are examined with the purpose of discovering if there are a priori arguments for retaining certain parts of a planning system within the public bureaucracy. © 2009 Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSage Publications, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.com/journal.aspx?pid=243en_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Planning Education and Researchen_US
dc.subjectDevelopment Controlen_US
dc.subjectEnforcementen_US
dc.subjectIncomplete Contractingen_US
dc.subjectLand-Use Regulationen_US
dc.subjectPlanningen_US
dc.subjectProbityen_US
dc.subjectSovereign Transactionsen_US
dc.subjectTransaction Costsen_US
dc.subjectZoningen_US
dc.titleAre some planning transactions intrinsically sovereign?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailWebster, CJ: cwebster@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWebster, CJ=rp01747en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0739456X08330977en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-67149118256en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-67149118256&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume28en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage476en_US
dc.identifier.epage490en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000266764400006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWebster, CJ=7201838784en_US

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