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Article: Homeowners associations, collective action and the costs of private governance

TitleHomeowners associations, collective action and the costs of private governance
Authors
KeywordsCollective Action
Gated Communities
Homeowners Association
Institutional Evolution
Neighbourhoods
Rent-Seeking
Taiwan
Transaction Costs
Issue Date2005
PublisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02673037.asp
Citation
Housing Studies, 2005, v. 20 n. 2, p. 205-220 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper examines collective action problems in privately managed neighbourhoods and considers government and market reponses to these. Taiwan's experience of Home Owners Associations (HOAs) is used to show that entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to deliver private governance capacity and are apparently more effective in doing so than either government (by coercion) or residents (by voluntary association). However, government needs to reduce certain collective action costs by providing appropriate enabling legislation. While the market can deliver private democratic government, it cannot do so in a way that avoids many of the costly features of public government. Within HOAs, problems of information asymmetry and opportunism, collective action and rent-seeking all persist. The paper concludes that much of the efficiency of contractual democratic neighbourhoods comes through the privatisation of bureaucracy-handing over civic goods and services supply and management to highly competitive and innovative property companies-rather than through HOA governance structures per se. The latter are characterised by many of the same problems that weigh down conventional municipal government. © 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/183442
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.309
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.101
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChen, SCYen_US
dc.contributor.authorWebster, CJen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-27T08:38:07Z-
dc.date.available2013-05-27T08:38:07Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.citationHousing Studies, 2005, v. 20 n. 2, p. 205-220en_US
dc.identifier.issn0267-3037en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/183442-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines collective action problems in privately managed neighbourhoods and considers government and market reponses to these. Taiwan's experience of Home Owners Associations (HOAs) is used to show that entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to deliver private governance capacity and are apparently more effective in doing so than either government (by coercion) or residents (by voluntary association). However, government needs to reduce certain collective action costs by providing appropriate enabling legislation. While the market can deliver private democratic government, it cannot do so in a way that avoids many of the costly features of public government. Within HOAs, problems of information asymmetry and opportunism, collective action and rent-seeking all persist. The paper concludes that much of the efficiency of contractual democratic neighbourhoods comes through the privatisation of bureaucracy-handing over civic goods and services supply and management to highly competitive and innovative property companies-rather than through HOA governance structures per se. The latter are characterised by many of the same problems that weigh down conventional municipal government. © 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherRoutledge. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02673037.aspen_US
dc.relation.ispartofHousing Studiesen_US
dc.subjectCollective Actionen_US
dc.subjectGated Communitiesen_US
dc.subjectHomeowners Associationen_US
dc.subjectInstitutional Evolutionen_US
dc.subjectNeighbourhoodsen_US
dc.subjectRent-Seekingen_US
dc.subjectTaiwanen_US
dc.subjectTransaction Costsen_US
dc.titleHomeowners associations, collective action and the costs of private governanceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailWebster, CJ: cwebster@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityWebster, CJ=rp01747en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/026730303042000331736en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-16344371133en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-16344371133&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume20en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.spage205en_US
dc.identifier.epage220en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000228148200003-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChen, SCY=8268818500en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWebster, CJ=7201838784en_US

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