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Article: Do severe penalties deter corruption? A Game-theoretic analysis of the Chinese case

TitleDo severe penalties deter corruption? A Game-theoretic analysis of the Chinese case
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherChinese University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.chineseupress.com/asp/JournalList_en.asp?CatID=1&Lang=E&JournalID=9
Citation
China Review, 2012, v. 12 n. 2, p. 1-32 How to Cite?
AbstractDespite severe punishments such as the death penalty, corruption is not effectively deterred in China. This research discusses the ineffective deterrence of corruption from a game-theoretic perspective. I first form a corruption-investigation game based on Tsebelis's model on crimes and sanctions. Next I extend the basic model by linking the two players' payoffs. Finally, I construct a static game of incomplete information by considering different types of investigator. With the unique advantage of game theory, this research finds that to deter corruption, (1) simply increasing the penalty can counterintuitively decrease the frequency of investigation; (2) it is important to promote incentives for the investigator, such as rewarding anticorruption monetarily or politically; and (3) it is also important to maintain a sufficient proportion of officials who have incentives to fight corruption.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/179395
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.536
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.210
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Jen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:55:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:55:39Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationChina Review, 2012, v. 12 n. 2, p. 1-32en_US
dc.identifier.issn1680-2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/179395-
dc.description.abstractDespite severe punishments such as the death penalty, corruption is not effectively deterred in China. This research discusses the ineffective deterrence of corruption from a game-theoretic perspective. I first form a corruption-investigation game based on Tsebelis's model on crimes and sanctions. Next I extend the basic model by linking the two players' payoffs. Finally, I construct a static game of incomplete information by considering different types of investigator. With the unique advantage of game theory, this research finds that to deter corruption, (1) simply increasing the penalty can counterintuitively decrease the frequency of investigation; (2) it is important to promote incentives for the investigator, such as rewarding anticorruption monetarily or politically; and (3) it is also important to maintain a sufficient proportion of officials who have incentives to fight corruption.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherChinese University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.chineseupress.com/asp/JournalList_en.asp?CatID=1&Lang=E&JournalID=9en_US
dc.relation.ispartofChina Reviewen_US
dc.titleDo severe penalties deter corruption? A Game-theoretic analysis of the Chinese caseen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhu, J: zhujn@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhu, J=rp01624en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84867965015en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros219739-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84867965015&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume12en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.spage1en_US
dc.identifier.epage32en_US
dc.publisher.placeHong Kongen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhu, J=24777769300en_US

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