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Article: A critical comparison of the various plausible inter-echelon gaming processes in supply chain models

TitleA critical comparison of the various plausible inter-echelon gaming processes in supply chain models
Authors
KeywordsGame Theory
Inventory
Stackelberg Game
Two-Echelon Supply Chain Models
Issue Date2005
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/index.html
Citation
Journal Of The Operational Research Society, 2005, v. 56 n. 11, p. 1273-1286 How to Cite?
AbstractAn increasing number of supply-chain models are related to the following structure: (i) a manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer-who fixes a retail price and then retails the product to the consumers; (ii) the effect of the retail price on sales volume is dictated by a deterministic demand curve known to both parties. Results from these models depend very much on the 'gaming process' that is assumed to govern how the manufacturer and the retailer interact with each other. This paper reviews and compares some basic characteristics of seven seemingly plausible gaming processes; including the two most common ones: the manufacturer-Stackelberg and the fixed-markup-retailer processes. Our results show that: (i) each of the seven processes appear to be no less plausible than the other six; (ii) all seven processes possess some implausible characteristics; (iii) the relationships among the processes are confusing and do not appear to be intuitively logical; (iv) the relationships among these processes are further complicated by the way they are affected by the form of the assumed demand curve. Our results show that in supply-chain modelling more attention should be given to: (i) the proper selection of an appropriate gaming process assumption; (ii) how the model's results change under different gaming processes; (iii) the incorporation of information asymmetry that will allow these gaming-process assumptions to become more realistic. © 2005 Operational Research Society Ltd. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177953
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.225
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.026
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, AHLen_US
dc.contributor.authorLau, HSen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:40:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:40:57Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of The Operational Research Society, 2005, v. 56 n. 11, p. 1273-1286en_US
dc.identifier.issn0160-5682en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177953-
dc.description.abstractAn increasing number of supply-chain models are related to the following structure: (i) a manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer-who fixes a retail price and then retails the product to the consumers; (ii) the effect of the retail price on sales volume is dictated by a deterministic demand curve known to both parties. Results from these models depend very much on the 'gaming process' that is assumed to govern how the manufacturer and the retailer interact with each other. This paper reviews and compares some basic characteristics of seven seemingly plausible gaming processes; including the two most common ones: the manufacturer-Stackelberg and the fixed-markup-retailer processes. Our results show that: (i) each of the seven processes appear to be no less plausible than the other six; (ii) all seven processes possess some implausible characteristics; (iii) the relationships among the processes are confusing and do not appear to be intuitively logical; (iv) the relationships among these processes are further complicated by the way they are affected by the form of the assumed demand curve. Our results show that in supply-chain modelling more attention should be given to: (i) the proper selection of an appropriate gaming process assumption; (ii) how the model's results change under different gaming processes; (iii) the incorporation of information asymmetry that will allow these gaming-process assumptions to become more realistic. © 2005 Operational Research Society Ltd. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherPalgrave Macmillan Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/index.htmlen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of the Operational Research Societyen_US
dc.subjectGame Theoryen_US
dc.subjectInventoryen_US
dc.subjectStackelberg Gameen_US
dc.subjectTwo-Echelon Supply Chain Modelsen_US
dc.titleA critical comparison of the various plausible inter-echelon gaming processes in supply chain modelsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailLau, AHL: ahlau@business.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLau, AHL=rp01072en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601956en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-27144538654en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-27144538654&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume56en_US
dc.identifier.issue11en_US
dc.identifier.spage1273en_US
dc.identifier.epage1286en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000232482600005-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, AHL=7202626080en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, HS=36942855500en_US
dc.identifier.citeulike345480-

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