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Article: Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders

TitleCharacteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders
Authors
Frankel, RLi, X
KeywordsAnalysts
Capital Markets
Information Asymmetry
Insider Trading
Issue Date2004
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae
Citation
Journal Of Accounting And Economics, 2004, v. 37 n. 2, p. 229-259 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.004
AbstractWe examine how financial statement informativeness, analyst following, and news relate to the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Corporations' timely disclosures of value relevant information and information collection by outsiders reduce information asymmetry, limiting insiders' ability to trade profitably on private information. We use the profitability and intensity of insider trades to proxy for information asymmetry. We find that increased analyst following is associated with reduced profitability of insider trades and reduced insider purchases. Financial statement informativeness is negatively associated with the frequency of insider purchases. However, company news, good or bad, is positively associated with insider purchase frequency. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177952
ISSN
0165-4101
2021 Impact Factor: 7.293
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.607
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000222045900004
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFrankel, Ren_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:40:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:40:57Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Accounting And Economics, 2004, v. 37 n. 2, p. 229-259en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4101en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177952-
dc.description.abstractWe examine how financial statement informativeness, analyst following, and news relate to the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Corporations' timely disclosures of value relevant information and information collection by outsiders reduce information asymmetry, limiting insiders' ability to trade profitably on private information. We use the profitability and intensity of insider trades to proxy for information asymmetry. We find that increased analyst following is associated with reduced profitability of insider trades and reduced insider purchases. Financial statement informativeness is negatively associated with the frequency of insider purchases. However, company news, good or bad, is positively associated with insider purchase frequency. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jaeen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Accounting and Economicsen_US
dc.subjectAnalystsen_US
dc.subjectCapital Marketsen_US
dc.subjectInformation Asymmetryen_US
dc.subjectInsider Tradingen_US
dc.titleCharacteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsidersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailLi, X: xuli1@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLi, X=rp01615en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.004en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-2542494013en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-2542494013&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume37en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.spage229en_US
dc.identifier.epage259en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000222045900004-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridFrankel, R=7101875642en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, X=42961803500en_US
dc.identifier.citeulike10637744-
dc.identifier.issnl0165-4101-

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