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Article: Policy on international R+D cooperation: subsidy or tax?

TitlePolicy on international R+D cooperation: subsidy or tax?
Authors
Issue Date1998
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Citation
European Economic Review, 1998, v. 42 n. 9, p. 1727-1750 How to Cite?
AbstractIn this paper we derive the non-cooperative, optimal policy towards international R+D cooperation. Two types of R+D cooperation are considered: collaboration and coordination. When firms cooperate, the familiar strategic behavior, which prevails in R+D competition, is reduced, or eliminated, or even completely reversed. However, we prove that R+D subsidy is still an optimal policy for individual governments in the case of R+D coordination and, more strikingly, the subsidies are larger for higher degrees of coordination. Government policies do not help the firms to commit. In the case of R+D collaboration, both R+D subsidy and tax are possible. With linear demands, however, tax is never optimal; moreover, we show that the optimal policy is subsidy regardless of the strategic nature (substitute or complement) of the strategy variables, a result that contradicts the traditional wisdom.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177929
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.095
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.712
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorQiu, LDen_US
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:40:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:40:52Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Economic Review, 1998, v. 42 n. 9, p. 1727-1750en_US
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177929-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we derive the non-cooperative, optimal policy towards international R+D cooperation. Two types of R+D cooperation are considered: collaboration and coordination. When firms cooperate, the familiar strategic behavior, which prevails in R+D competition, is reduced, or eliminated, or even completely reversed. However, we prove that R+D subsidy is still an optimal policy for individual governments in the case of R+D coordination and, more strikingly, the subsidies are larger for higher degrees of coordination. Government policies do not help the firms to commit. In the case of R+D collaboration, both R+D subsidy and tax are possible. With linear demands, however, tax is never optimal; moreover, we show that the optimal policy is subsidy regardless of the strategic nature (substitute or complement) of the strategy variables, a result that contradicts the traditional wisdom.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Economic Reviewen_US
dc.rightsEuropean Economic Review. Copyright © Elsevier BV.-
dc.titlePolicy on international R+D cooperation: subsidy or tax?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailQiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityQiu, LD=rp01093en_US
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00097-4en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0345390146en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros43988-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0345390146&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume42en_US
dc.identifier.issue9en_US
dc.identifier.spage1727en_US
dc.identifier.epage1750en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000077018000007-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridQiu, LD=7201538008en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTao, Z=7201884505en_US

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