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Article: Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game

TitleLearning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game
Authors
KeywordsAssignment Game
Common-Pool Resources
Laboratory Experiment
Learning
Repeated Games
Teaching
Turn Taking
Issue Date2013
PublisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Citation
Economic Theory, 2013, v. 54 n. 2, p. 335-357 How to Cite?
AbstractHistory-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177803
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.137
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.097
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCason, TNen_US
dc.contributor.authorLau, SHPen_US
dc.contributor.authorMui, VLen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:57Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:57Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Theory, 2013, v. 54 n. 2, p. 335-357en_US
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177803-
dc.description.abstractHistory-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Theoryen_US
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectAssignment Gameen_US
dc.subjectCommon-Pool Resourcesen_US
dc.subjectLaboratory Experimenten_US
dc.subjectLearningen_US
dc.subjectRepeated Gamesen_US
dc.subjectTeachingen_US
dc.subjectTurn Takingen_US
dc.titleLearning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment gameen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailLau, SHP: laushp@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLau, SHP=rp01073en_US
dc.description.naturepostprinten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-012-0718-yen_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84884589754en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros235724-
dc.identifier.spage335en_US
dc.identifier.epage357en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1432-0479-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000324779500006-
dc.publisher.placeGermanyen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridCason, TN=7004398300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, SHP=7401596159en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridMui, VL=6602214315en_US
dc.identifier.citeulike11416465-

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