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Article: Endogenous lobbying positions

TitleEndogenous lobbying positions
Authors
Issue Date2008
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576&site=1
Citation
Review Of International Economics, 2008, v. 16 n. 4, p. 641-653 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper develops a two-country, two-firm model to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra-industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free-trade position. The model predicts that taking the free-trade lobbying position is an efficient firm's dominant strategy. If two firms have high costs (or when the demand is very weak), there exist two equilibria: either both firms take the free-trade position or both take the protectionist lobbying position. In other cases, both firms taking the free-trade lobbying position is a unique equilibrium. © 2008 The Authors Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177761
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.558
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.518
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorQiu, LDen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:49Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:49Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.citationReview Of International Economics, 2008, v. 16 n. 4, p. 641-653en_US
dc.identifier.issn0965-7576en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177761-
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a two-country, two-firm model to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra-industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free-trade position. The model predicts that taking the free-trade lobbying position is an efficient firm's dominant strategy. If two firms have high costs (or when the demand is very weak), there exist two equilibria: either both firms take the free-trade position or both take the protectionist lobbying position. In other cases, both firms taking the free-trade lobbying position is a unique equilibrium. © 2008 The Authors Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576&site=1en_US
dc.relation.ispartofReview of International Economicsen_US
dc.titleEndogenous lobbying positionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailQiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityQiu, LD=rp01093en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00769.xen_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-50249168800en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-50249168800&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume16en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage641en_US
dc.identifier.epage653en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9396-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000207842700003-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridQiu, LD=7201538008en_US
dc.identifier.citeulike3151000-

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