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Article: Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective

TitleCorporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective
Authors
KeywordsAgency Problems
Corporate Governance
Earnings Management
Tunneling
Issue Date2007
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin
Citation
Journal Of Corporate Finance, 2007, v. 13 n. 5, p. 881-906 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999-2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177750
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.286
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.446
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Qen_US
dc.contributor.authorLu, ZJen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:48Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:48Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Corporate Finance, 2007, v. 13 n. 5, p. 881-906en_US
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177750-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999-2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Corporate Financeen_US
dc.subjectAgency Problemsen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectEarnings Managementen_US
dc.subjectTunnelingen_US
dc.titleCorporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspectiveen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailLiu, Q: qliu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLiu, Q=rp01078en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.07.003en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-36349034500en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros130411-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-36349034500&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume13en_US
dc.identifier.issue5en_US
dc.identifier.spage881en_US
dc.identifier.epage906en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000251930100011-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLiu, Q=55429572300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLu, ZJ=23009263600en_US
dc.identifier.citeulike2022149-

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