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Article: Protection of trade for innovation: The roles of Northern and Southern Tariffs

TitleProtection of trade for innovation: The roles of Northern and Southern Tariffs
Authors
KeywordsImitation
Innovation
Intellectual Property Rights
North
South
Tariff
Issue Date2004
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jwe
Citation
Japan And The World Economy, 2004, v. 16 n. 4, p. 449-470 How to Cite?
AbstractUsing a North-South trade model with innovation and imitation, we investigate the interaction of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and trade protection. We show that unlike a Southern tariff, a Northern tariff supplements IPR protection and is not necessarily a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The globally optimal Northern tariff increases as IPR protection in the North or the South decreases. Global welfare may rise as Northern tariff increases, but necessarily declines as Southern tariff increases. This suggests that pushing for freer trade in the South is more urgent than in the North in innovation-intensive sectors where IPR protections are weak in both regions. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177730
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.603
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.477
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorQiu, LDen_US
dc.contributor.authorLai, ELCen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:43Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.citationJapan And The World Economy, 2004, v. 16 n. 4, p. 449-470en_US
dc.identifier.issn0922-1425en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177730-
dc.description.abstractUsing a North-South trade model with innovation and imitation, we investigate the interaction of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and trade protection. We show that unlike a Southern tariff, a Northern tariff supplements IPR protection and is not necessarily a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. The globally optimal Northern tariff increases as IPR protection in the North or the South decreases. Global welfare may rise as Northern tariff increases, but necessarily declines as Southern tariff increases. This suggests that pushing for freer trade in the South is more urgent than in the North in innovation-intensive sectors where IPR protections are weak in both regions. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jween_US
dc.relation.ispartofJapan and the World Economyen_US
dc.subjectImitationen_US
dc.subjectInnovationen_US
dc.subjectIntellectual Property Rightsen_US
dc.subjectNorthen_US
dc.subjectSouthen_US
dc.subjectTariffen_US
dc.titleProtection of trade for innovation: The roles of Northern and Southern Tariffsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailQiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityQiu, LD=rp01093en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0922-1425(03)00025-2en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-22944491731en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-22944491731&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume16en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage449en_US
dc.identifier.epage470en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000225342300003-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridQiu, LD=7201538008en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLai, ELC=7201466555en_US

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