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Article: Executive compensation and managerial incentives: A comparison between Canada and the United States

TitleExecutive compensation and managerial incentives: A comparison between Canada and the United States
Authors
KeywordsExecutive Compensation
G32
Incentives
J33
Performance
Issue Date1999
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin
Citation
Journal Of Corporate Finance, 1999, v. 5 n. 3, p. 277-301 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper compares executive pay-performance sensitivities between Canadian firms and US firms. Examining the data for 365 Canadian firms and 675 US firms over the years 1991-1994, we find that the pay-performance sensitivity associated with direct pay and stock ownership is smaller in Canadian firms than in US firms but that the difference diminishes as firm size increases. We also find that during this period Canadian firms underperformed US firms and Canadian CEOs were paid substantially lower than were their US counterparts. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the pay-performance relationship, depending on the intensity of economic regulation, affects corporate performance.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177710
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.286
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.446
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:38Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:38Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Corporate Finance, 1999, v. 5 n. 3, p. 277-301en_US
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177710-
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares executive pay-performance sensitivities between Canadian firms and US firms. Examining the data for 365 Canadian firms and 675 US firms over the years 1991-1994, we find that the pay-performance sensitivity associated with direct pay and stock ownership is smaller in Canadian firms than in US firms but that the difference diminishes as firm size increases. We also find that during this period Canadian firms underperformed US firms and Canadian CEOs were paid substantially lower than were their US counterparts. Our findings are consistent with the argument that the pay-performance relationship, depending on the intensity of economic regulation, affects corporate performance.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Corporate Financeen_US
dc.subjectExecutive Compensationen_US
dc.subjectG32en_US
dc.subjectIncentivesen_US
dc.subjectJ33en_US
dc.subjectPerformanceen_US
dc.titleExecutive compensation and managerial incentives: A comparison between Canada and the United Statesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhou, X: xianzhou@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, X=rp01129en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0929-1199(99)00008-5-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0041707112en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0041707112&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume5en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.spage277en_US
dc.identifier.epage301en_US
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, X=8217375200en_US

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