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Article: On the feasibility of unpopular policies under re-election concerns

TitleOn the feasibility of unpopular policies under re-election concerns
Authors
Issue Date2002
PublisherSouthern Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.okstate.edu/economics/journal/jour1.html
Citation
Southern Economic Journal, 2002, v. 68 n. 4, p. 841-858 How to Cite?
AbstractA common concern about political decision making is that re-election concerns compel incumbent politicians to select policies that, although popular among the electorate, are inferior to available, less popular alternatives. Through studying a series of models, I find that, as long as politicians differ solely in the utility derived from holding office, there always exists an equilibrium where incumbents with strong re-election concerns still make efficient policy choices. However, when other aspects of heterogeneity among politicians are present, incumbents with strong re-election concerns may have the incentive to condition their decisions according to policy popularity. Suppose, for instance, some politicians are dumb in the sense that they are even more ignorant about policy efficacy than the public. To avoid being viewed as dumb, nondumb politicians (especially those with strong reelection concerns) may accept popular but inefficient policies or reject unpopular but efficient policies.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177689
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.788
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.586
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorStephen Chiu, Yen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:32Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.citationSouthern Economic Journal, 2002, v. 68 n. 4, p. 841-858en_US
dc.identifier.issn0038-4038en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177689-
dc.description.abstractA common concern about political decision making is that re-election concerns compel incumbent politicians to select policies that, although popular among the electorate, are inferior to available, less popular alternatives. Through studying a series of models, I find that, as long as politicians differ solely in the utility derived from holding office, there always exists an equilibrium where incumbents with strong re-election concerns still make efficient policy choices. However, when other aspects of heterogeneity among politicians are present, incumbents with strong re-election concerns may have the incentive to condition their decisions according to policy popularity. Suppose, for instance, some politicians are dumb in the sense that they are even more ignorant about policy efficacy than the public. To avoid being viewed as dumb, nondumb politicians (especially those with strong reelection concerns) may accept popular but inefficient policies or reject unpopular but efficient policies.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSouthern Economic Association. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.okstate.edu/economics/journal/jour1.htmlen_US
dc.relation.ispartofSouthern Economic Journalen_US
dc.titleOn the feasibility of unpopular policies under re-election concernsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailStephen Chiu, Y: sywchiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityStephen Chiu, Y=rp01057en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/1061495-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0036054311en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0036054311&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume68en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage841en_US
dc.identifier.epage858en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000175042900005-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridStephen Chiu, Y=7202775090en_US

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