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Article: Dowry and wife's welfare: A theoretical and empirical analysis

TitleDowry and wife's welfare: A theoretical and empirical analysis
Authors
Issue Date1999
PublisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
Citation
Journal Of Political Economy, 1999, v. 107 n. 4, p. 786-808 How to Cite?
AbstractBecker attributes the existence of marital transfers to inflexibility in the division of joint product within the marriage. If that were the only reason, we would not have observed the coexistence of dowries and bride-prices. This paper offers an alternative analysis. While Becker's interpretation is retained for bride-prices, a dowry is now represented as a premortem bequest by altruistic parents for a daughter. It not only increases the wealth of the new conjugal household but also enhances the bargaining power of the bride in the allocation of output within that household, thereby safeguarding her welfare. Using micro data from Taiwan, we found that a dowry improves the bride's welfare whereas a bride-price has no effect. These empirical results support the theoretical predictions of the model.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177679
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.75
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 7.646
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorChan, Wen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:30Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Political Economy, 1999, v. 107 n. 4, p. 786-808en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-3808en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177679-
dc.description.abstractBecker attributes the existence of marital transfers to inflexibility in the division of joint product within the marriage. If that were the only reason, we would not have observed the coexistence of dowries and bride-prices. This paper offers an alternative analysis. While Becker's interpretation is retained for bride-prices, a dowry is now represented as a premortem bequest by altruistic parents for a daughter. It not only increases the wealth of the new conjugal household but also enhances the bargaining power of the bride in the allocation of output within that household, thereby safeguarding her welfare. Using micro data from Taiwan, we found that a dowry improves the bride's welfare whereas a bride-price has no effect. These empirical results support the theoretical predictions of the model.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/en_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Political Economyen_US
dc.titleDowry and wife's welfare: A theoretical and empirical analysisen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChan, W: wchana@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChan, W=rp01049en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1086/250079en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0032719128en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0032719128&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume107en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage786en_US
dc.identifier.epage808en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000081732500006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhang, J=7601360094en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChan, W=26631464400en_US

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