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Article: Strategy-proofness and "median voters"

TitleStrategy-proofness and "median voters"
Authors
KeywordsAugmented Median-Voter Solutions
Single-Peaked Preferences
Strategy-Proofness
Issue Date1997
PublisherPhysica-Verlag GmbH und Co. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Citation
International Journal Of Game Theory, 1997, v. 26 n. 4, p. 473-490 How to Cite?
AbstractWe consider the problem of choosing a level of the public good for an economy in which agents have continuous and single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948). We show that a solution satisfying strategy-proofness and continuity if and only if it is an augmented median-voter solution. An augmented median-voter solution is described in terms of 2n parameters (which satisfy an anti-monotonicity condition) as follows: n + 1 of them are selected according to an increasing order of the peaks; the outcome is the median of these n + 1 parameters and the n peaks. This result establishes a formal connection between strategy-proofness and a generalized notion of median voter. (Similar median formulas were used by Moulin (1980) to describe smaller classes of solutions.) We provide an interpretation of these 2n parameters in terms of the following properties: anonymity, voter sovereignty, unanimity, and Pareto efficiency.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177668
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.577
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.878
SSRN
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChing, Sen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:29Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:29Z-
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal Of Game Theory, 1997, v. 26 n. 4, p. 473-490en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177668-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the problem of choosing a level of the public good for an economy in which agents have continuous and single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948). We show that a solution satisfying strategy-proofness and continuity if and only if it is an augmented median-voter solution. An augmented median-voter solution is described in terms of 2n parameters (which satisfy an anti-monotonicity condition) as follows: n + 1 of them are selected according to an increasing order of the peaks; the outcome is the median of these n + 1 parameters and the n peaks. This result establishes a formal connection between strategy-proofness and a generalized notion of median voter. (Similar median formulas were used by Moulin (1980) to describe smaller classes of solutions.) We provide an interpretation of these 2n parameters in terms of the following properties: anonymity, voter sovereignty, unanimity, and Pareto efficiency.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherPhysica-Verlag GmbH und Co. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Game Theoryen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectAugmented Median-Voter Solutionsen_US
dc.subjectSingle-Peaked Preferencesen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-Proofnessen_US
dc.titleStrategy-proofness and "median voters"en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailChing, S: steve.ching@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityChing, S=rp01056en_US
dc.description.naturepostprinten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/BF01813886-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0031312064en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0031312064&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume26en_US
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.spage473en_US
dc.identifier.epage490en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000072035400004-
dc.publisher.placeGermanyen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn3331-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChing, S=16411142700en_US

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