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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/0022-1996(95)01378-X
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0029485076
- WOS: WOS:A1995TJ40500003
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Article: Why can't countervailing duties deter export subsidization?
Title | Why can't countervailing duties deter export subsidization? |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Countervailing Duties Retaliation Strategic Export Subsidy Voluntary Export Restraints |
Issue Date | 1995 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jie |
Citation | Journal Of International Economics, 1995, v. 39 n. 3-4, p. 249-272 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition, threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former. To explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the GATT-conform countervailing duty measures, factors such as delay in retaliation, the GATT constraint on the amount of countervailing duties, and voluntary export restraints must be considered. We find that these factors lessen the efficacy of countervailing duty retaliation and therefore fail to deter export subsidization. © 1995. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177654 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 3.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.583 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Qiu, LD | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:26Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:26Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1995 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of International Economics, 1995, v. 39 n. 3-4, p. 249-272 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1996 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177654 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition, threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former. To explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the GATT-conform countervailing duty measures, factors such as delay in retaliation, the GATT constraint on the amount of countervailing duties, and voluntary export restraints must be considered. We find that these factors lessen the efficacy of countervailing duty retaliation and therefore fail to deter export subsidization. © 1995. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jie | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of International Economics | en_US |
dc.subject | Countervailing Duties | en_US |
dc.subject | Retaliation | en_US |
dc.subject | Strategic Export Subsidy | en_US |
dc.subject | Voluntary Export Restraints | en_US |
dc.title | Why can't countervailing duties deter export subsidization? | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Qiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Qiu, LD=rp01093 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/0022-1996(95)01378-X | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0029485076 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 39 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 3-4 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 249 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 272 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:A1995TJ40500003 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Qiu, LD=7201538008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-1996 | - |