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Article: Why can't countervailing duties deter export subsidization?

TitleWhy can't countervailing duties deter export subsidization?
Authors
KeywordsCountervailing Duties
Retaliation
Strategic Export Subsidy
Voluntary Export Restraints
Issue Date1995
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jie
Citation
Journal Of International Economics, 1995, v. 39 n. 3-4, p. 249-272 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition, threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former. To explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the GATT-conform countervailing duty measures, factors such as delay in retaliation, the GATT constraint on the amount of countervailing duties, and voluntary export restraints must be considered. We find that these factors lessen the efficacy of countervailing duty retaliation and therefore fail to deter export subsidization. © 1995.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177654
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.017
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.723
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorQiu, LDen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:26Z-
dc.date.issued1995en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of International Economics, 1995, v. 39 n. 3-4, p. 249-272en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177654-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that in a duopoly model of international market competition, threatened imposition of countervailing duties by a domestic country generally deters a foreign country from subsidizing its exports to the former. To explain the coexistence of export subsidization and the GATT-conform countervailing duty measures, factors such as delay in retaliation, the GATT constraint on the amount of countervailing duties, and voluntary export restraints must be considered. We find that these factors lessen the efficacy of countervailing duty retaliation and therefore fail to deter export subsidization. © 1995.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jieen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of International Economicsen_US
dc.subjectCountervailing Dutiesen_US
dc.subjectRetaliationen_US
dc.subjectStrategic Export Subsidyen_US
dc.subjectVoluntary Export Restraintsen_US
dc.titleWhy can't countervailing duties deter export subsidization?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailQiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityQiu, LD=rp01093en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/0022-1996(95)01378-X-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0029485076en_US
dc.identifier.volume39en_US
dc.identifier.issue3-4en_US
dc.identifier.spage249en_US
dc.identifier.epage272en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:A1995TJ40500003-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridQiu, LD=7201538008en_US

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