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Article: Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: Comment

TitleUnderstanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: Comment
Authors
KeywordsCorporate Governance
G32
L14
L22
Managerial Ownership
Issue Date2001
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec
Citation
Journal Of Financial Economics, 2001, v. 62 n. 3, p. 559-571 How to Cite?
AbstractHimmelberg et al. (J. Financial Econom. 53 (1999) 353-384) argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. I show that managerial ownership, while substantially different across firms, typically changes slowly from year to year within a company. With rational managers maximising long-term utility, small, one-year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within-year changes in performance. By relying on within variation, fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177643
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.541
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 9.920
SSRN
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:24Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:24Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Financial Economics, 2001, v. 62 n. 3, p. 559-571en_US
dc.identifier.issn0304-405Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177643-
dc.description.abstractHimmelberg et al. (J. Financial Econom. 53 (1999) 353-384) argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. I show that managerial ownership, while substantially different across firms, typically changes slowly from year to year within a company. With rational managers maximising long-term utility, small, one-year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within-year changes in performance. By relying on within variation, fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfecen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Financial Economicsen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectG32en_US
dc.subjectL14en_US
dc.subjectL22en_US
dc.subjectManagerial Ownershipen_US
dc.titleUnderstanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: Commenten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhou, X: xianzhou@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, X=rp01129en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00085-Xen_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0003300715en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0003300715&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume62en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.spage559en_US
dc.identifier.epage571en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000172299800005-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn300482-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, X=8217375200en_US

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