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Article: On the Dynamic Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria
Title | On the Dynamic Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 1997 |
Publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jet |
Citation | Journal Of Economic Theory, 1997, v. 75 n. 1, p. 213-229 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D (research and development) competition. It shows that Cournot competition induces more R&D effort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are weak, or products are very different. If R&D productivity is high, spillovers are strong, and goods are close substitutes, then the Bertrand equilibrium islessefficient than the Cournot equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: L13. © 1997 Academic Press. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177637 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.218 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Qiu, LD | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1997 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Economic Theory, 1997, v. 75 n. 1, p. 213-229 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177637 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with R&D (research and development) competition. It shows that Cournot competition induces more R&D effort than Bertrand competition. However, the price is lower and output is larger in Bertrand than in Cournot competition. Furthermore, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D productivity is low, or spillovers are weak, or products are very different. If R&D productivity is high, spillovers are strong, and goods are close substitutes, then the Bertrand equilibrium islessefficient than the Cournot equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: L13. © 1997 Academic Press. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jet | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | en_US |
dc.title | On the Dynamic Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Qiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Qiu, LD=rp01093 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1006/jeth.1997.2270 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0000470850 | en_US |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0000470850&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 75 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 213 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 229 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:A1997XK43300011 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Qiu, LD=7201538008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-0531 | - |