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Article: Land readjustment: an innovative urban experiment in China

TitleLand readjustment: an innovative urban experiment in China
Authors
Issue Date2007
PublisherSage Publications Ltd.. The Journal's web site is located at http://usj.sagepub.com/
Citation
Urban Studies, 2007, v. 44 n. 1, p. 81-98 How to Cite?
AbstractConventionally, urban renewal initiated by the private sector is not that different from other trading activities. A developer purchases property rights from the suppliers, who are the property owners of the renewal site, in the open market for a price. Once the deal is done, the suppliers are out of the picture and the developer moves on to the renewal project and starts replacing the existing structure with new buildings for a better use. The developer would prefer not to have the individual owners involved in the renewal process for various reasons such as management problems and profit sharing. From an institutional economic perspective, this is a classic example of market governance structure as the asset is non-specific to a certain extent and the developer is not integrating the supplier (property owners) into the firm. However, on some rare occasions, the developer may adopt a bilateral firm governance structure by incorporating the individual property owners. This, in the context of rural land renewal, has been known as the land readjustment model. Based on the theoretical framework of institutional economics and transaction cost theory, this paper explores the rationale behind the developer and even the public authority choosing to adopt this model in the process of urban renewal by examining two examples in two very different cities in China.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/168758
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.934
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.567
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, LHen_US
dc.contributor.authorLi, Xen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-08T03:32:09Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-08T03:32:09Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.citationUrban Studies, 2007, v. 44 n. 1, p. 81-98en_US
dc.identifier.issn0042-0980en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/168758-
dc.description.abstractConventionally, urban renewal initiated by the private sector is not that different from other trading activities. A developer purchases property rights from the suppliers, who are the property owners of the renewal site, in the open market for a price. Once the deal is done, the suppliers are out of the picture and the developer moves on to the renewal project and starts replacing the existing structure with new buildings for a better use. The developer would prefer not to have the individual owners involved in the renewal process for various reasons such as management problems and profit sharing. From an institutional economic perspective, this is a classic example of market governance structure as the asset is non-specific to a certain extent and the developer is not integrating the supplier (property owners) into the firm. However, on some rare occasions, the developer may adopt a bilateral firm governance structure by incorporating the individual property owners. This, in the context of rural land renewal, has been known as the land readjustment model. Based on the theoretical framework of institutional economics and transaction cost theory, this paper explores the rationale behind the developer and even the public authority choosing to adopt this model in the process of urban renewal by examining two examples in two very different cities in China.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSage Publications Ltd.. The Journal's web site is located at http://usj.sagepub.com/en_US
dc.relation.ispartofUrban Studiesen_US
dc.titleLand readjustment: an innovative urban experiment in Chinaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailLi, LH: lhli@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailLi, X: lixincat@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityLi, LH=rp01010en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00420980601023844en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-34250746953en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros111216-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-34250746953&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume44en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.spage81en_US
dc.identifier.epage98en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000243523300005-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, LH=8418463000en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, X=16643420800en_US

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