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Article: Fair share: Siting noxious facilities as a risk distribution game under nontransferable utility

TitleFair share: Siting noxious facilities as a risk distribution game under nontransferable utility
Authors
Issue Date2002
PublisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeem
Citation
Journal Of Environmental Economics And Management, 2002, v. 43 n. 2, p. 251-266 How to Cite?
AbstractThe search for equitable solutions to the siting of noxious facilities has long been an unresolved problem, theoretically and politically. Common prescriptions often involve compensating host communities. In this article, we address the case when compensation is not an option, or when we are unable to translate risk into a common measure of utility. We propose a new analytic for finding equity-based fair-share distributions of risk, which translates directly to mixed siting strategies. In order to do this, we employ a new general solution concept for n-person bargaining games under nontransferable utility. We discuss conditions under which the existence of such solutions can be proven. Last, we illustrate the solution concept with application to the LANCER project, a controversial municipal incinerator originally proposed for East Los Angeles, comparing results obtained with the (Ntu)Shapley value with the actual proposal. Finally, we point out that solutions will involve risk elimination, not just redistribution per se, but we need both, and to talk of one without the other is at times unjust, at times ineffectual, and often both. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167127
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.197
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.915
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLejano, RPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorDavos, CAen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T04:04:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T04:04:31Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Environmental Economics And Management, 2002, v. 43 n. 2, p. 251-266en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0095-0696en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167127-
dc.description.abstractThe search for equitable solutions to the siting of noxious facilities has long been an unresolved problem, theoretically and politically. Common prescriptions often involve compensating host communities. In this article, we address the case when compensation is not an option, or when we are unable to translate risk into a common measure of utility. We propose a new analytic for finding equity-based fair-share distributions of risk, which translates directly to mixed siting strategies. In order to do this, we employ a new general solution concept for n-person bargaining games under nontransferable utility. We discuss conditions under which the existence of such solutions can be proven. Last, we illustrate the solution concept with application to the LANCER project, a controversial municipal incinerator originally proposed for East Los Angeles, comparing results obtained with the (Ntu)Shapley value with the actual proposal. Finally, we point out that solutions will involve risk elimination, not just redistribution per se, but we need both, and to talk of one without the other is at times unjust, at times ineffectual, and often both. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeemen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Environmental Economics and Managementen_HK
dc.titleFair share: Siting noxious facilities as a risk distribution game under nontransferable utilityen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLejano, RP: lejano@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLejano, RP=rp01666en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jeem.2000.1178en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0036517018en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0036517018&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume43en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage251en_HK
dc.identifier.epage266en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000174368700005-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLejano, RP=6602298801en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDavos, CA=35550636500en_HK

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