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Article: Siting noxious facilities with victim compensation: N-person games under transferable utility

TitleSiting noxious facilities with victim compensation: N-person games under transferable utility
Authors
Issue Date2001
PublisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/seps
Citation
Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2001, v. 35 n. 2, p. 109-124 How to Cite?
AbstractThe siting of noxious facilities embodies the classic efficiency-equity dilemma, where efficiency tends toward centralized facilities, while equity favors completely dispersed siting schemes. Traditional prescriptions for confronting this dilemma generally focus on the issue of victim compensation. The foremost task concerns determining the proper amount of compensation to be received by host communities. In this paper, the case of transferable utility is taken up, where mechanisms for carrying out sidepayments (i.e., compensation) exist. This analysis proposes that the siting problem is best handled as an allocation game for which methods from n-person cooperative game theory are well suited. This new approach addresses a long-standing need for a rigorous framework within which solutions based on principles of equity can be formulated. The kinds of outcomes generated by this new analytic stands in contrast to, and underscores the serious inadequacies of, traditional, often ad hoc prescriptions for solving the siting game. For one thing, the analysis suggests that the traditional formula, that of transferring utility so as to bring all players to the point of Pareto efficiency, undercompensates victims. In short, without a framework such as proposed herein, stakeholders may find themselves debating proposed solutions that ultimately violate basic notions of equity and, so, fail to engender cooperative modes of behavior needed for sustainable solutions. In fact, traditional notions of compensation, by violating the so-called core constraints, may give players inherent incentive to defect from cooperative agreements. Given this condition, it should come as no surprise that the outcome of many negotiations is terminal impasse. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167124
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.796
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.513
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLejano, RPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorDavos, CAen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T04:04:31Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T04:04:31Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_HK
dc.identifier.citationSocio-Economic Planning Sciences, 2001, v. 35 n. 2, p. 109-124en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0038-0121en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167124-
dc.description.abstractThe siting of noxious facilities embodies the classic efficiency-equity dilemma, where efficiency tends toward centralized facilities, while equity favors completely dispersed siting schemes. Traditional prescriptions for confronting this dilemma generally focus on the issue of victim compensation. The foremost task concerns determining the proper amount of compensation to be received by host communities. In this paper, the case of transferable utility is taken up, where mechanisms for carrying out sidepayments (i.e., compensation) exist. This analysis proposes that the siting problem is best handled as an allocation game for which methods from n-person cooperative game theory are well suited. This new approach addresses a long-standing need for a rigorous framework within which solutions based on principles of equity can be formulated. The kinds of outcomes generated by this new analytic stands in contrast to, and underscores the serious inadequacies of, traditional, often ad hoc prescriptions for solving the siting game. For one thing, the analysis suggests that the traditional formula, that of transferring utility so as to bring all players to the point of Pareto efficiency, undercompensates victims. In short, without a framework such as proposed herein, stakeholders may find themselves debating proposed solutions that ultimately violate basic notions of equity and, so, fail to engender cooperative modes of behavior needed for sustainable solutions. In fact, traditional notions of compensation, by violating the so-called core constraints, may give players inherent incentive to defect from cooperative agreements. Given this condition, it should come as no surprise that the outcome of many negotiations is terminal impasse. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/sepsen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofSocio-Economic Planning Sciencesen_HK
dc.titleSiting noxious facilities with victim compensation: N-person games under transferable utilityen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLejano, RP: lejano@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLejano, RP=rp01666en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0038-0121(00)00009-4en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0034992539en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0034992539&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume35en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage109en_HK
dc.identifier.epage124en_HK
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLejano, RP=6602298801en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDavos, CA=35550636500en_HK

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