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Article: Cooperative solutions for sustainable resource management

TitleCooperative solutions for sustainable resource management
Authors
KeywordsCommon-pool resources
Core
Equity
Game theory
Sustainability
Issue Date1999
PublisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00267/
Citation
Environmental Management, 1999, v. 24 n. 2, p. 167-175 How to Cite?
AbstractMany environmental management issues can be defined as allocation problems, e.g., the allocation of rights to use common-pool resources or the allocation of the cost of regional resource development projects. The allocation methods developed in the area of cooperative n-person game theory are most appropriate for these problems because they focus on the conditions for engendering and sustaining the necessary cooperation among the involved stakeholders. These solution concepts seek to ensure that the allocation is based on some norm of equity and, most often, also to minimize the incentive for any player to defect from the cooperative venture. We illustrate these solution concepts with an application to a water resource project in Southern California. We argue how the rigorous mathematical nature of these solution concepts should not hinder their application to actual situations and how, with the use of heuristic rules and inexact notions of comparable worths, we can employ these concepts even in approximate fashion. We remind ourselves that the goal of such an endeavor is to convince stakeholders of the equity of a proposed solution and, in so doing, maximize the prospect of sustained cooperation. The alternative to cooperation, on the other hand, maybe endless stalemate.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167121
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.857
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.830
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLejano, RPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorDavos, CAen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T04:04:30Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T04:04:30Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_HK
dc.identifier.citationEnvironmental Management, 1999, v. 24 n. 2, p. 167-175en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0364-152Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/167121-
dc.description.abstractMany environmental management issues can be defined as allocation problems, e.g., the allocation of rights to use common-pool resources or the allocation of the cost of regional resource development projects. The allocation methods developed in the area of cooperative n-person game theory are most appropriate for these problems because they focus on the conditions for engendering and sustaining the necessary cooperation among the involved stakeholders. These solution concepts seek to ensure that the allocation is based on some norm of equity and, most often, also to minimize the incentive for any player to defect from the cooperative venture. We illustrate these solution concepts with an application to a water resource project in Southern California. We argue how the rigorous mathematical nature of these solution concepts should not hinder their application to actual situations and how, with the use of heuristic rules and inexact notions of comparable worths, we can employ these concepts even in approximate fashion. We remind ourselves that the goal of such an endeavor is to convince stakeholders of the equity of a proposed solution and, in so doing, maximize the prospect of sustained cooperation. The alternative to cooperation, on the other hand, maybe endless stalemate.en_HK
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00267/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofEnvironmental Managementen_HK
dc.subjectCommon-pool resourcesen_HK
dc.subjectCoreen_HK
dc.subjectEquityen_HK
dc.subjectGame theoryen_HK
dc.subjectSustainabilityen_HK
dc.titleCooperative solutions for sustainable resource managementen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLejano, RP: lejano@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLejano, RP=rp01666en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s002679900224en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0033181105en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0033181105&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume24en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage167en_HK
dc.identifier.epage175en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000081192500003-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLejano, RP=6602298801en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridDavos, CA=35550636500en_HK

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