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Conference Paper: Reputation and Competition among Information Intermediaries

TitleReputation and Competition among Information Intermediaries
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherGame Theory Society.
Citation
The 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAME 2012), Istanbul, Turkey, 22-26 July 2012. In World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 2012, p. 1-53 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper investigates the e¤ect of competition on the reputation mechanism in the market for information intermediaries such as rating agencies. I use a dynamic model to endogenize the value of reputation to enable comparison of equilibria under di¤erent market structures. Behav- ior is determined in the model by weighing the current rating fee against the future value the rating agency derives from enjoying a good reputa- tion. I show that competition weakens the reputation mechanism, and thus worsens the quality of information by reducing the value of a good reputation but not the short-term gain of lying.
DescriptionSession ID 178: Reputations
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/166258

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLo, Pen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T08:30:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T08:30:52Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAME 2012), Istanbul, Turkey, 22-26 July 2012. In World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 2012, p. 1-53en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/166258-
dc.descriptionSession ID 178: Reputations-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the e¤ect of competition on the reputation mechanism in the market for information intermediaries such as rating agencies. I use a dynamic model to endogenize the value of reputation to enable comparison of equilibria under di¤erent market structures. Behav- ior is determined in the model by weighing the current rating fee against the future value the rating agency derives from enjoying a good reputa- tion. I show that competition weakens the reputation mechanism, and thus worsens the quality of information by reducing the value of a good reputation but not the short-term gain of lying.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherGame Theory Society.-
dc.relation.ispartofWorld Congress of the Game Theory Societyen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleReputation and Competition among Information Intermediariesen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailLo, P: peiyulo@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLo, P=rp01080en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.hkuros209171en_US
dc.identifier.spage1-
dc.identifier.epage53-

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