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Conference Paper: Why Does New Hampshire Matter: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates

TitleWhy Does New Hampshire Matter: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidates
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherThe Econometric Society.
Citation
The Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, Illinois, USA, 28 June-1 July 2012 How to Cite?
AbstractIn a multi-candidate election, a voter may prefer to vote for his second choice in order to defeat his least favorite candidate. I study a model in which voters know their own preference but infer support of each candidate from a private signal. I show that if private signals are su¢ ciently precise, an equilibrium exists and is unique in the limit as the size of the electorate increases. In this unique equlibrium, supporters of a candidate vote more strategically when their hate for their worst choice becomes more domi- nant, but they vote less strategically when the same is true for the opposite camp. Using this property, I show that in sequential primaries, winning early primaries improves a candidate s chance of winning later primaries by making his supporters in later primaries vote more sincerely. I show that sequential primaries help with coordination, but puts more weight on the preference of the median voters in the early primaries. When voters worry enough about defeating their worst choice, sequential primaries are better at aggregating preferences than simultaneous primaries.
DescriptionSession ID 38: Political Economy
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/166257

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLo, Pen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T08:30:52Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T08:30:52Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, Illinois, USA, 28 June-1 July 2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/166257-
dc.descriptionSession ID 38: Political Economy-
dc.description.abstractIn a multi-candidate election, a voter may prefer to vote for his second choice in order to defeat his least favorite candidate. I study a model in which voters know their own preference but infer support of each candidate from a private signal. I show that if private signals are su¢ ciently precise, an equilibrium exists and is unique in the limit as the size of the electorate increases. In this unique equlibrium, supporters of a candidate vote more strategically when their hate for their worst choice becomes more domi- nant, but they vote less strategically when the same is true for the opposite camp. Using this property, I show that in sequential primaries, winning early primaries improves a candidate s chance of winning later primaries by making his supporters in later primaries vote more sincerely. I show that sequential primaries help with coordination, but puts more weight on the preference of the median voters in the early primaries. When voters worry enough about defeating their worst choice, sequential primaries are better at aggregating preferences than simultaneous primaries.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherThe Econometric Society.-
dc.relation.ispartofEconometric Society North American Summer Meetingsen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleWhy Does New Hampshire Matter: Simultaneous vs. Sequential Election with Multiple Candidatesen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailLo, P: peiyulo@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityLo, P=rp01080en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.hkuros209169en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

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